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The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) was inaugurated in May 1996. It was formed in 
response to the need for an Academy of Science consonant with the dawn of democracy in 
South Africa: activist in its mission of using science and scholarship for the benefit of society, with 
a mandate encompassing all scholarly disciplines that use an open-minded and evidence-
based approach to build knowledge. ASSAf thus adopted in its name the term ‘science’ in 
the singular as reflecting a common way of enquiring rather than an aggregation of different 
disciplines. Its Members are elected on the basis of a combination of two principal criteria, 
academic excellence and significant contributions to society.
The Parliament of South Africa passed the Academy of Science of South Africa Act 
(No 67 of 2001), which came into force on 15 May 2002. This made ASSAf the only 
academy of science in South Africa officially recognised by government and representing 
the country in the international community of science academies and elsewhere.
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Authorship (Academic): academics generally publish their scholarly work and by 
definition become authors. Authorship is ascribed to or claimed by those who have 
been involved in the research and have made a substantive contribution to the 
completion of the work. Many journals have specific definitions of legitimate claims to 
authorship. For instance, according to the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors (Hoey, 2000) “each author should have participated sufficiently in the work to 
take public responsibility for appropriate portions of the content. One or more authors 
should take responsibility for the integrity of the work as a whole, from inception to 
published article”. The committee also recommended that “authors should provide 
a description of what each contributed, and editors should publish that information. 
All others who contributed to the work who are not authors should be named in the 
Acknowledgements, and what they did should be described”.
Co-authorship: two or more authors on a research publication are described as co-
authors. Such a publication may be described as being multi-authored.
Collaboration (in research): work done towards a common aim by a group of 
individuals, or by a number of research groups or institutions, or work performed across 
disciplines or between countries, or any combination of these. Collaboration in small 
teams is defined as joint work involving between 5 and 50 participants. Large teams 
are defined as > 50 people. More detailed definitions of collaboration, and discussion 
of its essential aspects, are given by Katz and Martin (1997), and Laudel (2002).
Research publication: this term is used in its broadest sense to include those forms of 
publications (articles, papers, conference proceedings, book chapters and books) 
which are recognised by the Department of Higher Education as accredited forms of 
research output. A research publication includes and is mostly synonymous with peer-
reviewed scientific academic publications where scientific refers to evidence-based 
as opposed to dealing exclusively with the natural sciences.
DEFINITIONS
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The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) is mandated to provide evidence-based 
science advice to government on matters of critical national importance; this consensus report 
contributes to fulfilment of this mandate. 
The report covers the results of a study undertaken by an ASSAf panel on the ways in which 
the contribution of individuals to the outputs of large scale (>100 participants) collaborative 
research projects could be more appropriately recognised and rewarded in South Africa. The 
study was motivated by the increasing participation of individual researchers in large national 
and international collaborations and reports from these team members that their specific 
contribution is generally under-recognised by the existing performance appraisal systems within 
tertiary educational institutions. In particular, individual outputs are assessed using the simplistic 
proxy measure of research publication units, based on the Department of Higher Education and 
Training (DHET) formula, which assigns a value of zero to any publication with more than 100 co-
authors. The latter practice is referred to in this report as hyperauthorship.
The DHET formula is the basis on which one component of its funding to public research and higher 
education institutions (PRHEIs) is calculated, and these institutions have thereby been incentivised 
to increase the output of annual publications by their staff. In many PRHEIs, the proportional 
publication unit calculation has also been used within the university internal management 
processes to incentivise faculties, departments and individual researchers to increase their 
publication outputs. A primary conclusion of this study is that the use of the proportional publication 
unit for assessing the performance of individuals is simplistic, misleading and should not be used.
Considering the limitations of the present system, five alternative publication count schemes, 
based on international practices and literature reports, were investigated as part of the study. In 
each case, the impact of the alternative formula on the assessed output of individual researchers, 
and the overall institutional subsidy, assuming the ongoing use of the DHET framework, was 
determined. The simulations led to the following conclusions:
 • The impact on the alternative schemes, with the exception of the Modified Korean Model
and the Mesnard Model, which include a more extreme version of non-proportional counting,
is minimal (<.5%). This result is to be expected considering that hyperauthorship is a small
proportion of the total number of scientific publications (<3%).
 • Similarly, the impact of the alternatives on the net DHET subsidy per PRHEI, relative to the
present values as calculated using the DHET formula, is minimal (~2%), even though the
institutions have diverse levels of hyperauthorship.
 • However, the impact at an individual level will be considerable. For instance, a physics
researcher working in a large team, who may not unreasonably be expected to publish about
200 hyperauthored papers per year, will receive a unit score of about two vs the previous
value of zero.
FOREWORD
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In view of these results, and the overall comments from a diverse range of respondents within the 
research system to the study questions, the panel makes the following recommendations.
A. Recommendations to PRHEIs on the assessment of Individual researchers
There should to be a greater awareness within PRHEIs of the phenomenon of hyperauthorship 
and the associated bimodal distribution of publication authors (see Figure 7 in the main report), 
especially in disciplines such as physics, genomics, medicine and statistics, where this practice is 
more prevalent. Individual performance appraisal should not be based on the DHET publication 
unit framework, which represents a misleading proxy for individual research productivity. Neither 
should it be used as a means of appointing or promoting academics. Publication counts are 
generally a poor proxy for the assessment of research quality and are highly misleading when 
used at the level of the individual. 
B. Recommendations to the DHET on its funding and performance management
relationship with Institutions
Although the incentive has been effective in achieving its intended outcome (increasing scientific 
publications by the PRHEIs), it should be modified in two important ways. First, the formula for the 
calculation of units should be amended to include hyperauthored publications. At present, such 
units are rounded to zero.
Secondly the subsidy should be refinanced in order to ensure that the real value per publication 
unit is not allowed to decline any further. It is noted that the actual value of the award has 
declined by 19% in actual and 45% in real terms over the period 2011 to 2018 (the estimated 
value for 2018 is R104,000 per unit) and a larger allocation of funds is required in order to maintain 
a constant real value per publication unit.
We note that the algorithms for the counting of publications, that have been tested in this study, 
are not the only possible approaches that could be used; the intention was not to be exhaustive, 
but rather to explore alternatives to the present system. In the light of the objective of this study it 
was considered that a non-proportional approach would be a better alternative to the current 
system of incentive funding.  We also note that the assessment and evaluation of research output, 
particularly at the level of the individual, is the subject of global debate and that new practices 
are currently being explored and tested.
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Within the digital era, the landscape of publishing research is changing rapidly. Many more 
journal titles are now available, and most journals are available online. Research fields are rapidly 
expanding, and few researchers can claim to be experts across even one discipline. This trend 
has dictated the need for large multidisciplinary teams, rather than individuals working in isolation, 
to undertake research projects. Publications from these large groups of necessity have many 
authors and in fact some publications have many hundreds of authors. 
This report was undertaken to determine whether researchers in South Africa who publish within 
these large consortia are appropriately recognised in the South African context, including the 
systems by which authors are evaluated and rewarded, with specific reference to multi-authored 
publications. The study sought to establish the current practices in South Africa and compare 
these with international best practice. Lastly the report provides a number of recommendations 
to improve this aspect of the current system.
The panel initially undertook a review of the literature regarding co-authorship. The review 
confirmed that there has been an increase in co-authorship globally over the last fifty years 
and that in some fields the maximum number of co-authors has increased dramatically. What 
is noteworthy is that in terms of recognition and co-authorship, there are no universal standards 
and the allocation of authorship credits can vary between fields. It is clear that examples of 
publication incentives have been used as part of performance management in many parts of 
the world. The review also provided a summary of the funding formula used by the South African 
DHET in the allocation of its performance-based block funding to the HEIs. 
It was also apparent that there were many individual histories with regard to individual rewards 
and recognition for published research. In order to get a clearer idea of the perceptions across 
the country, the panel undertook a survey in collaboration with the Centre of Excellence in 
Scientometrics and Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (SciSTIP). This resulted in the 
section titled ‘Study on the Attitudes of Researchers towards Publication Incentive: Is Proportional 
Counting a Fair System?’. Almost 1,000 respondents completed the survey. Only 40% of the 
respondents felt that the current system was “fair and equitable”. The majority were neutral 
on the issue as to whether the current incentives were a barrier to co-publishing. There were 
some inherent contradictions within the responses to some of the questions, and the individual 
comments reflected the diverse perceptions of the respondents. The final statement at the end of 
this section summarises the current state of affairs: “it is also clear that the system is inconsistently 
implemented and that there are varying degrees of understanding in terms of its actual operation. 
Both issues could be beneficially addressed at institutional level given a willingness to support the 
research system and the way in which co-authorship patterns are changing”.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Given the diversity of practices and perceptions within the research community in the country, 
the panel decided that it was also necessary to interview executives at a number of South African 
universities and research-performing science councils on how the reward and recognition of multi-
authored publications were being managed at their own institutions. Due to the impracticality 
of exhaustive interviews, a sample of institutions based on publication unit output was identified. 
In all the institutions interviewed, researchers received some funding linked to publication units. 
Most of the executives interviewed were of the opinion that the current system is effective at 
incentivising publication outputs.
From the interviews of the executives it appears that despite the lack of DHET incentive for 
participation in large collaborations, researchers are increasingly taking part in such collaborations 
for other reasons. Institutions are responding to the problem by ensuring that such people are not 
disadvantaged in terms of their career development and, at least in some cases, their effort is 
recognised and rewarded in other ways. Some useful suggestions as to how the system could be 
improved are included in the conclusions to this section of the report.
The DHET approach, referred to as proportional counting, has a number of weaknesses including 
two concerns of the panel, namely that the system discourages collaboration and fails to 
recognise the contribution of individuals within large research teams (>100 authors). As a result, 
five alternative models were proposed by the panel models and tested using institutional-level 
data on publication outputs sourced from CREST. A more thorough scope, extending beyond the 
five alternatives, was considered to lie outside the panel’s initial Terms of Reference.  The 
selected models were chosen as examples of the types of analyses that could be done should 
DHET wish to consider an alternative approach.
Heavier weightings for collaborative publications, as used in model 1 (Modified Korean Model) 
and model 2 (Mesnard Model), significantly increase the total publication unit count (by 36% and 
104% respectively), and hence decrease the value of each publication unit.  In other words, the 
impact of these models at the institutional level would be considerable, with research funding to 
the more productive institutions being reduced. Models 3, 4 and 5, all of which use a modified 
DHET approach and allow for a more accurate rendition of proportional counting on articles for 
which the number of authors exceeds 100, have little impact on the level of funding for individual 
higher education institutions (HEIs), with the predicted changes being less than ~2%, even for 
the most prolific institutions. However, the impact on individual scores would be appreciable, 
since single researchers with a high output (>50) of multi-author publications could move from a 
publication unit count of zero to 0.5.
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The occurrence of hyperauthorship is challenging the use of existing performance appraisal 
systems and requires the revision of such systems in the interests of what could be described as 
‘performance justice’, which can be loosely defined as the principle that two academics who 
achieve equally, but work in different disciplines, should be equally rewarded or acknowledged. 
The impact of the widely used DHET ‘publication unit’-based approach to performance 
appraisal is well illustrated by a comparison of the publication outputs from two academics, the 
one working in the engineering field, and the other in particle physics. The ‘average’ professor 
could be expected to generate 5 to 10 publications per year, equivalent to 2 to 5 publication 
units. However, a physicist working within several large research teams might (co-) author 50 to 
100 publications per year, which will be measured as zero publication units (publications with 
more than 100 co-authors are rounded to zero). It is apparent, in these circumstances, that the 
proportional counting metric is misleading.
Chapter 1. Recommendations to HE Institutions on to their treatment of Individuals
1. There needs to be a greater awareness within HEIs of the ‘bimodal distribution’ in the numbers 
of co-authors (Fig. 7, p 24), particularly in the case of disciplines such as physics, genomics, 
medicine and statistics, where large numbers of co-authors are becoming more prevalent.
2. In the disciplines identified in Recommendation 1, the appraisal of an individual’s performance 
should take cognisance of these developments.
3. The DHET publication unit system should not be used as a metric to measure the publication 
output of individuals for the reasons articulated in the San Francisco Declaration on Research 
Assessment (DORA) (see appendix D).
4. The use of the publication unit system is a poor proxy for the assessment of research productivity 
and should not be used in the selection and promotion of academics. 
Chapter 2. Recommendations to the DHET on its Funding and Performance 
Management Relationship with Institutions
1. The DHET formula for allocation of units should be modified to include publications with in 
excess of 100 co-authors. The funding formula is suggested in Proposal 5, p 79.
2. The funding per publication unit should be increased. Its real value has fallen as a result of 
inflation and as a function of the doubling of the number of recognised units produced. The 
incentive has been effective in achieving its intended outcome, but a larger allocation of 
funds is required in order to maintain a constant real value per publication unit to continue 
the successful trend. 
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Early in 2016, the ASSAf agreed to initiate a multi-disciplinary study of the ways in which collaborative 
research could be appropriately recognised and rewarded in South Africa (ASSAf, 2016). The 
study was motivated by the increasing participation of individual academics and researchers 
in large national and international collaborations (Castelvecchi, 2015), and reports from these 
team members that their specific contribution was generally under-recognised by the existing 
performance appraisal systems within public research institutions (for further details, see section 
below on “What are the consequences of hyper-authorship for performance appraisal?”).  
Given the important role of collaboration as a means of enhancing the local research capability 
and as catalysing innovation, ASSAf undertook to review South Africa’s systems for recognising 
individual contributions to high quality collaborative research, and hence to provide a basis for 
informed decision-making on the appropriate recognition for such individuals in the future. The 
detailed Terms of Reference for the review are included in Appendix A. It was intended that 
the outcomes of the study would provide research institutions, HEIs, policymakers and funders 
with recommendations and guidelines for implementing policies that will promote, support and 
encourage excellence in research, particularly excellence in collaborative research, while at the 
same time providing the appropriate recognition for the participating individuals. 
The study has been undertaken in four separate phases. In the first phase, a literature review 
was undertaken in order to develop the necessary background material for the study including 
information on the extent and drivers of collaboration and co-authorship; present systems for 
the evaluation and recognition of contributions of individual authors in research papers; the 
consequences of such systems; and alternative systems, particularly for multi-author publications, 
which are presently being proposed or implemented. The results of this phase are reported in 
Chapter 2.
In the second phase, ASSAf has endeavoured to survey the perceptions of the research community 
within South Africa’s public research institutions towards the present system of proportional 
counting and publication units. The survey was undertaken as a joint project between ASSAf 
and SciSTIP, with the key question being whether the system can be considered as ‘fair and 
equitable’, or whether it is inequitable and therefore acts as a barrier to collaboration and co-
authorship. The results of the survey are presented in Chapter 3.
In the third phase of the study, the panel interviewed the Deputy Vice Chancellors: Research 
(DVCs) of several public research universities in South Africa on the institutional response to, and 
impact of, the present system. In broad terms, this phase sought to clarify the perspectives of the 
DVCs on the general approach and impact of publication counts as a performance metric, the 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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use of proportional counting, the allocation of rewards, the ASSAf-defined understanding of the 
problem statement (that proportional counting fails to adequately recognise participation in 
large collaborations) and possible recommendations for alternative systems. The details of these 
interviews are reported in Chapter 4.
In the fourth and final phase of the study, the consequences of adopting five alternative models 
(algorithms) for the calculation of publication units have been assessed using simulations based 
on actual publication outputs at both system and institutional level for the years 1996 and 2016. 
The results of the study are covered in Chapter 5.
THE RISE AND RATIONALE OF HYPERAUTHORSHIP 
How has hyperauthorship arisen?
Hyperauthorship is a consequence of changes in the practice of modern science in certain 
disciplines, particularly astronomy and high-energy physics. It is a global, not just a developed 
country, phenomenon which changed co-authorship practices across a range of countries, 
including South Africa, e.g. the initial paper on the Higgs boson, with more than 2,000 co-authors, 
contained a substantial number of South African authors (Aad et al., 2012). 
The approach of hyperauthorship is an attempt to address the difficulty of recognising the 
contribution of individuals working within large teams, where each member may play only a 
small, but still significant part, in the overall research effort. Rather than attempt the impractical 
task of accrediting individuals, these teams agreed to adopt collaborative authorship lists, and 
to publish as a team rather than as sub-groups of authors. 
Among the first to acknowledge the contribution of teams through hyperauthorship was the 
European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), and its associated ATLAS (A Toroidal 
LHC ApparatuS), CMS (Compact Muon Solenoid) and ALICE (A Large Ion Collider Experiment) 
collaborations1. Examples of collaborative authorships and even collaboration of collaborations 
include the following:
 • two separate papers covering the discovery of a new particle (the Higgs) and the proof that 
it fits the Standard Model (Aad et al., 2012; Chatrchyan et al., 2012);
 • subsequent work, jointly authored by ATLAS and CMS, which announced the measurement of 
the Higgs boson mass (Aad et al., 2015);
1 Further details on CERN and the collaborations are available at https://home.cern/, https://atlas.cern/, https://home.cern/science/
experiments/cms and https://home.cern/science/experiments/alice).
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 • an example of a collaboration of collaborations covers the discovery of a binary neutron 
star merger or kilonova (Abbott et al., 2017). The publication signalled the beginning of a 
new scientific discipline, multi-messenger astronomy; this founding study involved not only 
observations of gravitational waves, but also radio, infrared, optical, ultraviolet, X-ray, 
gamma-ray, and neutrino observations. A significant number of South Africans are amongst 
the authors, including people from the Southern African Large Telescope (SALT), South African 
Astronomical Observatory (SAAO), High Energy Stereoscopic System (HESS), and the SA 
Square Kilometre Array (SKA)/MeerKAT groups as well as individuals from five South African 
Universities. 
These examples serve to illustrate the acceptance of major discoveries by extended teams working 
under collaborative authorship lists, and the standing of the journals reviewing the publications. 
The experiments involved are global collaborations requiring considerable investment in scientific 
resources that include computation, theory and instrumentation. In the case of ATLAS, the ATLAS 
Publications Committee and the ATLAS Authorship Committee provided the policy on General 
Publications and on Scientific Notes, which then formed the basis for the authorship lists of the first 
two of the above examples.
In the astronomical community, authorship lists vary according to the publication. Publication by 
the Gravitational Wave community and the SAAO, for example, was governed by a memorandum 
of understanding and related policies. The content of such agreements and policies will cover 
whether data or announcements may be embargoed until joint publication is enabled, how 
publications are submitted to the collaborative leadership before publication, when work may be 
published separately, acknowledgement requirements, and how observing time will be allocated 
in the minutes and hours after a trigger. In some cases, policies also state that authorship will be 
agreed by the specific members of a collaboration contributing to a paper. 
What are the consequences of hyperauthorship for performance appraisal?
The occurrence of hyperauthorship is challenging the use of existing performance appraisal 
systems and requires the revision of such systems in the interests of what could be described 
as performance justice, or the principle that two academics who achieve equally, but work in 
different disciplines, should be equally rewarded or acknowledged.
The impact of the widely-used DHET approach to performance appraisal is well illustrated by a 
comparison of the publication outputs from two academics, the one working in the engineering 
field, and the other in particle physics. The ‘average’ professor could be expected to generate 
5 to 10 publications per year, equivalent to 2 to 5 publication units (see Figure 1). However, 
RECOGNISING INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH: 
Limitations of Proportional Publication Counts and Proposals for Alternatives 17
a physicist working within several large research teams might (co-) author 50 to 100 publications 
per year, also shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Comparison of publication outputs: physicist vs. ‘average’ academic
Using the DHET system, the publication unit scores for the two professors are shown in Figure 2 (A 
indicates the score where the publications are initially counted and the final score is rounded; B 
is the case where the publication units are rounded first and then summed):
Figure 2. Comparison of publication units: physicist vs. ‘average’ academic
 
The comparison is insightful; there is a big difference between the two scores, and it is apparent 
that the proportional counting approach is misleading (particularly where the score is first 
rounded and then summed). It is this discrepancy which formed the basis for the ASSAf study.
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2.1 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW
The approach of a narrative review has been followed (Cronin et al., 2008), the intention of 
which has been to provide a summary of the topical and relevant literature on the main subject 
(recognising the contribution of individual researchers within large teams). The narrative review 
differs from the systematic review in that it is not designed to be as comprehensive or rigorous. 
Whereas a systematic review is usually a meta-analysis which is characterised by the separate 
steps of formulating the research question, defining the inclusion criteria, accessing and selecting 
the literature, coding and finally synthesising the results, a narrative review starts with a more 
broadly phrased research question, uses a more limited set of primary data, does not prescribe 
to an initial set of tightly defined exclusion criteria and avoids the use of coding or quantitative 
analysis of the primary data (Enferm, 2007).
The review was divided into five main areas, as shown in Table 1; in each case a set of keywords 
was developed and then translated into a search string. The suggested references were compiled 
into a single list and then individually accessed through the University of Pretoria (UP) library site. 
In cases where the actual article was not available as open access, the abstract was screened, 
and the full article only retrieved when the content as described in the abstract was considered 
to be relevant to the subject.
This initial screen was tailed by a standard snowball technique in which further relevant articles 
were identified from a more detailed study of all the references through the keyword search. The 
second-generation articles were in turn studied and another generation of references obtained 
if key issues emerged; the third-generation articles were then read and used to identify a fourth 
generation.
Table 1. Subject areas and keywords applied in the literature review
Section Title Sub-Heading Keywords
1 Definitions None
collaboration; co-authorship; 
authorship; large team; small team; 
recognition
2
Trends in Research 
and Development 
(R&D) (Single Author 
vs. Collaboration)
Inter and Multi-Disciplinary trends; R&D; interdisciplinary; multidisciplinary; review
General Overview of Growth 
in Co-Author Publications
growth; distribution; co-author; 
authorship publications2
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2 Actual search string: trend* and (R&D or research*) and (inter-disciplin* or multi-disciplin* or collabor* or co-author*)
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Section Title Sub-Heading Keywords
3
General Overview 
of Performance 
Management in R&D
Performance Management 
at Policy Level 
(management of institutions)
policy; institutional performance 
management; public research 
institutions; universities3
Performance Management 
within Performance 
Agencies (management of 
individuals)
performance management; 
performance agencies; public 
research institutions; recognition
Performance Management 
of Teams performance management; team
Variations in Performance 
Management Systems
performance management; country 
differences; discipline differences4
4
Existing Approaches 
to Recognising 
(Large) Teamwork
None researcher performance management systems; multi-authorship; large teams5
5
Policy Conflicts 
in Performance 
Management
None policy conflict; researcher performance management6
Altogether more than 200 references were identified, from which 137 relevant articles were 
retrieved and then grouped into separate folders according to the structure provided in Table 1. 
Each article was read, and the main points summarised. If the article was considered to be highly 
relevant to this study, it was labelled for further analysis and referencing.
2.2 THEORIES OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND INCENTIVES
It would be misleading to consider that all behaviour is driven by the single-minded and highly 
individualistic pursuit of maximum reward for minimum effort. Behaviour is the result of complex 
interactions between multiple systems, only some of which could be described as causal 
antecedents. Sociologists and psychologists, seeking to explain patterns of human behaviour, 
have developed a number of models and theories, all of which have limitations in certain contexts 
and aspects.
In this review, the framework of principal-agent theory has been used as a means of providing 
a structure for the study and hence a more logical approach to the various articles than would 
otherwise have been possible (Ross, 1973). The framework considers the relationship between 
two actors, namely the agent, who is able to make decisions on behalf of the other actor, known 
as the principal (see Figure 3). The relationship is common to all contractual arrangements, 
including those between an employee (agent) and an employer (principal).
3 Actual search string: (performance manage*) and (polic* or fund* or team*). Also used approach* and (r&d or research*) and polic*
4 Actual search string: (performance management system or researcher performance manage*) and variation*
5 Actual search string: (recogni* or acknowledge* or reward* or incentiv* or encourage* or approach*) and (collaborat* or partner* 
or team* or “working together”) and (research or r&d)
6 Actual search string: (performance manage*) and (polic* or fund* or team* or institution*) and conflict*
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Figure 3. The actors in agency theory (including teams)
In cases of common interest between the principal and the agent, and hence mutual benefit, 
there is synergy between the actions or decisions of the agent, and the goals of the principal. 
However, in a situation of ‘asymmetric information’, the objectives of the two actors do not align 
and the decisions of the agent may adversely affect the interests of the principal. In this case, the 
classic principal-agent problem or dilemma arises, with the extent of the deviation between the 
two interests being measured as ‘agency costs’.
In order to prevent this dilemma, principals act to incentivise individual performance and 
thereby minimise agency costs. Furthermore it is clear that agents respond strongly to pay-for-
performance schemes (Prendergast, 1999). However, this action can be counter-productive in 
a workplace setting which requires teamwork or collaboration and it has been shown that within 
such systems, the efforts made by employees to help co-workers are reduced and collaboration 
is minimised (Drago and Garvey, 1998). The challenge for organisations or principals is to maintain 
a balance between incentives which reward individual performance and those which recognise 
the contribution of teams. In essence, such a challenge goes to the core of the issue covered in 
this study.
In addition to the tension between individual effort and teamwork, which is an inherent 
consequence of the standard structure of employment contracting, there is also ambiguity in the 
literature on the relationship between productivity and reward. Although this relationship ought 
to be transparent and linear, it is claimed that there are persistent earnings inequalities which are 
the product of confounding factors such as gender, specialisation and visibility (Leahey, 2007). 
Clearly such factors undermine the just or fair functioning of a performance management system; 
in the event that the implementation of the system is poor, the achievement of the desired results 
will be unlikely.
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2.3 CO-AUTHORSHIP TRENDS IN RESEARCH
In this section, patterns and drivers of co-authorship are reviewed. The discussion assumes that 
co-authorship is a useful proxy for collaboration, and that by considering patterns of authorship, 
more fundamental trends in respect of collaborative relationships between researchers can be 
inferred. Such an assumption is not without its critics, who argue that not all co-authors may have 
been active collaborators, and that not all researchers who collaborate become co-authors 
(Laudel, 2002; Katz and Martin, 1997; Melin and Persson, 1996). Indeed there are several types 
of collaboration which are unrecognised within standard authorship practices, including service 
collaboration (generally the input of technicians), access to research equipment and sharing of 
know-how (Laudel, 2002).
However, the limitations of co-authorship as a proxy for collaboration is beyond the scope of this 
study. A number of factors have led to an increase in research collaboration and this pattern is 
perhaps imperfectly reflected by changes in authorship. In the next sections these patterns and 
the drivers thereof, are discussed. 
2.3.1 Authorship Patterns: 2002 to 2016
International
Patterns of co-authorship in academic publications have changed very significantly over the 
last four decades. Firstly collaboration, and hence levels of co-authorship, has increased in most 
disciplines, but particularly in astronomy (Ware and Mabe, 2015), physics (Huang, 2015; Merali, 
2015), biomedicine (Bourret et al., 2006; Cambrosio et al., 2004), molecular biology (Nabout et 
al., 2015), economics (Andrikopoulos et al., 2016; Nowell and Grijalva, 2011) and mathematics 
(Glänzel and Schubert, 2004), as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, this trend is expected to 
continue, supported by a number of factors including the prerequisites of funders, advances in 
communication and networking tools, the cost of scientific infrastructure, and the development 
are improved project management tools. 
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Figure 4. Average number of authors per paper (mathematics, physics and chemistry)
Source: Huang, 2015
Secondly a new phenomenon of ‘mega’ co-authorship, also known as hyperauthorship and 
defined as levels of co-authorship in excess of 2,000, has emerged relatively recently and is 
particularly prevalent in high energy physics, molecular biology and biomedical research 
(Castelvecchi, 2015; Beaver, 2001). In May 2015, a paper published in Physical Review Letters set 
a new record of 5,154 co-authors (Aad et al., 2015). If the current growth continues, it is predicted 
that the number of co-authors could surpass ten thousand in the 2020s.
Finally, the number of research articles has increased at a compound average growth rate of 
about 8% per year, correlating with an inherent increase in the absolute numbers of co-authored 
publications. Although the data is difficult to compare between various sources due to differences 
in the inclusion criteria, Plume and van Weijen (2014) report that in 2014 about 2.5 million research 
articles were published by about 28,100 peer-reviewed English-language journals, of which 1.5 
million articles from 2,550 publishers were listed in the Thomson Reuter’s Journal Citation Reports 
database (Ware & Mabe, 2015). 
South Africa
Similar trends have been observed in South Africa. Based on data from the CREST, the total number 
of research articles7 has increased by 354% over the period 1996 to 2015, and by 257% between 
2005 and 2015, as shown in Figure 5. The compound average growth rate over the latter period 
has been about 10%, which exceeds the global growth rates as noted in the previous section 
on international trends. As a result, the South African share of Web of Science (WoS) articles has 
increased from about 0.5% to 0.75% (Jammine, 2015).
7 The total article count includes all articles which are recognised by DHET and includes the listings in WoS, International Bibliography 
of the Social Sciences (IBSS) and local DHET-accredited journals.
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Figure 5. Total number of articles and publication units
Source: Mouton et al., 2019
Although the number of single-authored articles has increased slightly from 1,506 to 2,374 between 
1996 and 2015, their proportion of total articles has fallen from 21% to 9%, as shown in Figure 6. In 
this period the highest incidence number (of co-authors) shifted from 2 to 3 co-authors and the 
median rose from 2 to 4.
Figure 6. Frequency plot showing numbers of articles per level of co-authorship  
Source: CREST
There are two interesting aspects to this rising trend in the numbers of co-authors; firstly, publications 
are increasingly co-authored with authors who are located in other countries, a pattern which is 
loosely referred to as international collaboration. As shown in Figure 7, international co-authorship 
has increased from 60% to 70% of all research articles.
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Figure 7. Single, national and international co-authorships as a proportion of total articles
Source: CREST
Secondly the median number of authors on South African publications has risen from 2 to 4, as 
shown in Figure 8. The increase has been driven by two distinct and important trends, namely the 
increase in co-authored papers in the category 4 to 10 authors and a sudden increase post-2010 
in the number of papers with author levels exceeding 2,000, referred to as the ‘physics/astronomy 
bulge’.
This bulge can be seen very distinctly on a log plot of the overall frequency distributions for co-
authorship levels. It is noted that co-authorship patterns are log-normally distributed, hence the 
use of median as opposed to average values of co-authorship. However, the emergence of the 
physics/astronomy bulge has resulted in a clear bimodal distribution to the frequency plot, as 
shown in Figure 9. For instance, in 1996 there were only 6 papers out of a total of 7,000 papers 
with the number of co-authors exceeding 50, and no papers at all with co-authors exceeding 
500. In 2015, however, there were 511 articles with the number of co-authors exceeding 50 and 
272 exceeding 2,000, of which 271 were in the fields of physics and astronomy. In other words, the 
growth of the hyperauthored papers can be ascribed to a new pattern of co-authorship which 
has emerged in a very specific set of disciplines and is not widespread within the system.
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Figure 8. Increases in maximum and median author counts
Source: CREST
Figure 9. Bimodal pattern to frequency distribution of co-authorships (2015)
Source: CREST
Even though such hyperauthorship now accounts for about 20% of all publications in these two 
fields, the total number is small relative to the overall output. For instance, in 2015 only 1% of total 
publications fall in the >1,000 category, and over the whole period from 1996 to 2015, the figure 
is 0.5%. The low incidence of such publishing practice has implications for this study; considering 
the limited prevalence of the pattern, it is not clear whether there is a need for a system-wide 
response to the new trend.
Although academic productivity is not core to this study, it is included in this section as an example 
of how a performance management system can change the behaviour of academics. Levels of 
academic outputs per full time equivalent (FTE) academic have been rising, as shown in Figure 10, 
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an increase which has been ascribed to the implementation of a new funding framework for 
South African universities (Butler-Adam, 2015), as discussed in Section 2.4.2. The combined effect 
of an increase in publication units per researcher and levels of co-authorship indicates that 
collaborations involving South African academics are multiplying, a statement that is supported 
by recent work on patterns of co-authorship with international research teams (Sooryamoorthy, 
2015; Pouris and Ho, 2014). This trend is considered to be highly beneficial for the country’s research 
system since it extends access to critical resources, improves research quality and builds regional 
alliances focussed on shared problems. The authors of these studies argue that the rising trends 
in terms of co-authorship and collaboration need to be encouraged by dedicated funding and 
the redesign of present performance measurement systems which act as a disincentive (Pouris 
and Ho, 2014).
Figure 10. Academic productivity (outputs/FTE: 2009 to 2014)
Source: http://chet.org.za/data/sahe-open-data#.
2.3.2 Drivers of Collaboration and Co-Authorship
Given the theoretical framework presented in Section 2.2, it is unsurprising that demand side 
incentivisation is responsible at least in part for the reported increases in collaboration and 
multiple co-authorship, with such incentives including reward for numbers of publications, impact 
of publications and the international recognition through co-authorship networks (see Figure 11). 
However, the advent of demand side incentives is only part of a broader set of drivers, with other 
important factors being increasing specialisation; the use of co-authorship as a form of peer 
review due to rising opportunity costs; and risk diversification (Bruno, 2014). All these drivers are 
now discussed in more detail.
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Figure 11. Drivers of collaboration and co-authorship
Supply Side Management
The first four drivers are grouped together as ‘supply side’ factors and relate to reducing or 
minimising individual effort to achieve a higher quality standard within a context of rising 
opportunity costs and an increase in the complexity and depth of knowledge. 
Increasing Specialisation and Division of Labour: the division of labour as a result of increased 
specialisation has been considered as the most influential driver, with the broader issue being 
that it is more practical for an individual to obtain the necessary expertise for a research project 
through collaboration than through de novo self-learning (Bruno, 2014; Laband and Tollison, 
2000; McDowell and Melvin, 1983). Although collaboration may increase input costs, “authorship 
fosters higher quality by exploiting complementarities between multiple authors” (Bruno, 2014).
High Costs of Research Equipment: the costs of scientific equipment and experiments conducted 
on this equipment is a second important driver of collaboration (Katz and Martin, 1997). In an effort 
to contain these costs, countries, institutions and researchers seek to work in large, international 
teams where a common research platform is shared across multiple sites. Examples of such 
facilities include CERN, the international telescopes and the various synchrotrons.
Rising Opportunity Costs: increasing pressure on researchers to publish their work has eroded 
the tradition of collegiality and informal review within public research and higher education 
institutions (jointly referred to as PRHEIs), despite the important role that this input has played in 
raising the overall quality of a publication. As a result, academics have adopted the practice of 
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offering their colleagues co-authorship opportunities as a means of incentivising a higher level 
of effort on the detailed review of a publication. Within this context of rising opportunity costs, 
academics and researchers use offers of co-authorship as a means of guaranteeing quality and 
reducing the risk of rejection. To some extent this trend has been supported by the lower costs 
and greater ease of personal communication.
Risk Diversification: a related driver is the use of mutual co-authorship as a means of managing 
the stochastic or random nature of journal rejection risk. Most scientific or academic journals 
adopt a peer review process in which a submitted article is subject to double or single blind 
review by specialists in a relevant knowledge domain. This process carries an unpredictable 
element; articles rejected by one reviewer may be accepted by another. Assuming that quality 
is improved through co-authorship, as shown in a number of studies (Kim and Bak, 2016; Chung et 
al., 2009), and accepting that there is a random element to the peer review system, the likelihood 
of a single author having a certain number of publications accepted within a defined period of 
time is increased with larger numbers of submitted articles. This effect is referred to in this review 
as ‘risk diversification’ (Bandodkar and Grover, 2016; Bruno, 2014).
Demand Side Incentivisation
Demand side incentives act in multiple ways to drive a behaviour of co-authorship. In general, 
institutional and individual performance management systems within the research sector consider 
co-authorship to be beneficial to either the system (of innovation) or the institution. As a result, 
incentives are structured in order to drive co-authorship through the standard metrics of the 
number of articles (N), total citations per individual (C) and the strength of international networks. 
Number of Articles: if papers with X authors are not counted as 1/X papers, the benefit from co-
authorship is straightforward. Researchers choosing whether to work on a single-authored paper 
or on two dual-authored papers, exerting the same effort, will prefer the second option because 
it doubles the probability of a higher reward (Bruno, 2014). In practice, systems may adopt the 
1/X approach in which case the benefit of dual-authorship is minimal. However, as has already 
been noted, two submitted publications have a higher chance of acceptance than one single 
publication even if the article quality and potential benefit is equivalent.
Number of Citations: the number of citations per article is used as a measure of an article’s 
impact. This measure is frequently augmented by the h-index, which is defined as the unique and 
largest number of papers (h) ascribed to an author or organisation, which have been cited at 
least h times, and is an approximate measure of both quantity and quality of an author’s output 
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(Hirsch, 2005). There are several extensions to the h-index, including the h-bar index, which takes 
into account the effects of multiple co-authorship (Hirsch, 2010), the i10 index (the number of 
publications with at least 10 citations) and the g-index, which is defined as the largest number 
such that the top g articles received at least g2 citations (Egghe, 2006).
International Networks: the third incentive, which may be unique to the incentive structure for 
South African researchers, is the notion of international recognition. Given the long period of 
international isolation and its impact on the international stature of South African research, the 
NRF, through its evaluation system, has pursued a policy of rewarding ‘considerable international 
recognition’, which uses a variety of metrics including invitations to publish chapters or reviews in 
international books, invitations to act as a keynote speaker, awards by international organisations 
and leading roles in international collaborative research projects. 
Funding Allocations: funding agencies, alerted to the benefits of collaboration and multi-
disciplinary research, have sought to stimulate this behaviour through their funding instruments, 
in some cases adding collaboration as a separate evaluation category (alongside quality of 
the research idea, expertise in the team, relevance of the research problem) or in other cases, 
launching funding instruments which focus almost exclusively on building research networks. 
Examples of the latter include funds for building international links or networking with industry. 
All of the demand side incentives rely on the validity of principal-agent theory in their design and 
application. As a consequence of the performance management system within which they are 
located, researchers act in ways that maximise their individual interests whilst at the same time 
(hopefully) assisting their institution to achieve its goals and performance targets. On the supply 
side, researchers can shape the way in which they utilise their available resources in response to 
environmental pressures; on the demand side, organisations can design incentive structures to 
reward suitable behaviours. In the following sections, these performance management systems 
are discussed in more detail, beginning with institutional management and then looking at the 
management of individuals.
2.3.3 Present Approaches to the Ethical Assignment of Authorship
The ethics of authorship credit and assignment have been discussed and reviewed in this 
literature, with authors noting the lack of universal standards, the increasing difficulty of ensuring 
a fair distribution of credit given the changes to co-authorship, and the rising levels of disputes 
over authorship (Marušić et al., 2011; Feeser and Simon, 2008). One of the main ethical concerns 
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is the prevalence of underserved or ghost authorship, where authors are included in publications 
for reasons other than their direct contribution to the work. 
Although there appears to be a common understanding within the research community about 
the most important qualifying contributions which can lead to a claim for authorship, there are 
reports of widespread abuse of such principles, particularly within the university structure and its 
unequal power relations between researchers and senior academic staff. Although these cases 
do not constitute examples of research misconduct, reported in the literature at a prevalence of 
2%, ethical problems arise in as many as 29% of research collaborations (Marušić et al., 2011). It 
appears that there is a general lack of universal standards in the assignment of authorship even 
though such guidelines are necessary. It is therefore important that educational programmes for 
researchers stress the development of moral judgement in the allocation of authorship credits. 
The discussion on the ethics of authorship assignment go beyond the scope of this study. However, 
it is noted that the growth of co-authored papers may be the consequence of the absence of 
a set of normative standards relating to authorship credits. In the absence of such standards 
and in order to avoid any potential disputes, it may be easier to include all claims to authorship, 
regardless of whether these have been fully tested.
2.3.4 Summary of Trends and Drivers
In this section, the trends in respect of research collaboration and co-authorship of research 
publications, and the reasons for the changes, have been reviewed. It is evident that 
collaboration between researchers, as measured by levels of co-authorship, has increased in 
most disciplines over the last 40 years, but particularly in physics (Huang, 2015; Merali, 2015), 
biomedicine (Bourret et al., 2006; Cambrosio et al., 2004), molecular biology (Nabout et al., 2015), 
economics (Andrikopoulos et al., 2016; Nowell and Grijalva, 2011) and mathematics (Glänzel 
and Schubert, 2004). Furthermore, given the advances in communication and networking tools, 
and the development of improved management tools, it is likely that the size of collaborations 
will continue to grow. 
Mega collaborations (> 1,000 authors), which are a relatively new phenomenon in research, 
are particularly prevalent in high energy physics, molecular biology and biomedical research 
(Beaver, 2001). In May 2015, a paper published in Physical Review Letters set a new record of 
5,154 co-authors (Aad et al., 2015). If current growth continues, the number of co-authors could 
surpass 10,000 in the 2020s.
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There are a number of factors driving these increases in co-authorship and collaboration, including 
the need to reduce input costs, to improve the quality and impact of research publications, to 
access specialised expertise, and in response to the growing use of performance metrics which 
are based on publication outputs and the strength of research networks. In the next section, the 
general structure of such systems is reviewed.
2.4 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE RESEARCH SECTOR
2.4.1 Introductory Comments (Normative Principles)
Although there are unresolved debates and conflicting claims in the literature, it is useful at this 
stage to distil a set of normative principles which emerge from the research on performance 
management in PRHEIs. These principles follow:
On Benefits of Collaboration
 • Inter-institutional and international cooperation, as reflected by the number of co-authored 
publications, correlates strongly with research excellence and fractional count productivity1 
(Mali et al., 2016; Ductor, 2015)
 • The positive impact of multiple co-authorship on productivity is enhanced or amplified for 
authors occupying a central position within a research network (De Stefano and Zaccarin, 
2016), scholars who are connected to many different scholars, authors with repeated co-
authorships (Abbasi et al., 2011) or in the case of researchers who already have a high output 
(Ductor, 2015). In all cases, these researchers can exploit the externalities obtained from 
collaboration to a greater extent (Ductor, 2015).
 • For researchers in developing countries, co-authoring with international collaborators can 
increase research productivity by as much as 40% and can improve a researcher’s prospects 
of being involved in large international research projects (Ordóñez-Matamoros et al., 2010).
 • Journal articles with multiple authors generally achieve higher citation counts (and hence 
impact); however, there is a report to the effect that the enhancement may plateau at 3 to 5 
authors, with the addition of further authors being of lower impact (Avkiran and Alpert, 2015). 
In this study, it is assumed that the latter report has covered only a limited field and that it is 
not substantiated across all collaborations.
 • Social network theory has been used to explain the positive effects of co-authorship and 
collaboration on productivity; in particular, the networks are assumed to bridge structural 
gaps and facilitate knowledge exchange (Kuzhabekova, 2011).
8 Fractional count productivity refers to the calculation of productivity where the number of publications is divided in each case by 
the number of authors.
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On Performance Measurement and Management
 • Agents (researchers) respond strongly to pay-for-performance schemes (Prendergast, 1999).
 • Although imperfect proxies for performance, bibliographic metrics including number of 
publications, number of citations, and h-factors are widely used in the assessment of researcher 
productivity and academic value.
 • Whilst quantitative indicators can serve as reflections of research productivity and excellence, 
they should be supplemented by qualitative approaches where feasible (Mali et al., 2016).
 • A non-proportional reward for co-authorship (a paper with X authors is counted as > 1/X 
publication units) is the optimal solution for a PRHEI which wants to maximise researchers’ 
efforts, if high rewards are available (Bruno, 2014).
2.4.2 Performance Management of Institutions
A comprehensive review of the existing performance management frameworks for PRHEIs has not 
been possible within the scope of this review. Instead, the review has focussed on the approach 
of the DHET, which implemented a new framework for the allocation of funding to HEIs in 2004 
(Madue, 2007; Ministry of Education, 2004). The framework describes the procedures which are 
followed by the DHET in the allocation of its performance-based block funding to the HEIs.
The block grant consists of four sub-grants, namely the teaching input grant, the teaching output 
grant, the research output grant and the institutional factor grant, the values of which are 
calculated using a set of formulae and performance targets (Walwyn, 2008). The most relevant 
component of the block grant to this review is the research output grant, which is based on the 
output of research publications, research masters and doctorates. Research publications are 
counted using the approach of ‘publication units’ in which all research publications are assigned 
a value based on the type of publication (book, book chapter, article in a DHET accredited 
journal, or conference proceedings), authorship and in the case of books, the number of pages 
(DHET, 2015). The total number of publication units is then obtained from the sum of the individual 
components, as shown in Table 2 and in Equation 1. 
Table 2. Example calculation of institutional publication units
Item Number Authorship Publication Unit
Book 1 (>300 pages) Single 10
Book Chapter 1 Dual (each from a different institution) 2 * 0.5 = 1
Research Article 5 2 single; 3 dual from different institution) 2 + 1.5 = 3.5
Refereed Conference 
Proceedings
10 Dual (all from same institution) 10 * 0.5 = 5
Total 19.5
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Equation 1:
Where  PU = publication units
  Pi = maximum publication units for publication i
  X = number of authors
The research output grant is then calculated according to the following process (Walwyn, 2008):
 • Each institution is set a target for research output, based on the total research and teaching 
staff and a benchmark output per FTE staff member; in the case of the universities of technology 
this is 0.5 publication unit/FTE and for universities 1.25;
 • The subsidy per research output is then calculated by dividing the total budget by the total 
target research output;
 • The grant is calculated by multiplying the actual output units by the subsidy per expected 
output unit (to give the non-weighted grant);
 • This value is then adjusted for the under-performing institutions by adding a development 
grant which is proportional to the output shortfall (difference between actual and target 
outputs; the sum of the non-weighted grant and the development grant is referred to as the 
total grant).
There are a number of problems with this approach to the research output grant as follows:
 • It is a ‘zero sum game’; if the outputs of all the HEIs are higher than the benchmarks, the actual 
allocation per unit of research output decreases (Walwyn, 2008).
 • The system is not a level playing field; high performance institutions are set high targets and 
vice-versa. This aspect exists despite a number of other corrective measures to ensure that 
the weaker institutions have sufficient development funds, such as the institutional factors 
and the restructuring grants. As a result, poor performing institutions are rewarded rather than 
penalised for their performance.
 • In the case of co-authorship, the publication unit becomes rapidly and discouragingly small; 
for instance, when the number of authors exceeds 100, the assigned publication unit is zero 
since all values are truncated to two decimal places.
 • The publication unit does not address the issue of quality, only quantity, and may even 
discourage quality (Harley et al., 2016).
A previous ASSAf study has also highlighted an additional issue, as follows (ASSAf, 2019:131):
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“The second major problem with the DHET policy is its inherent bias against collaboration 
arising from the fractional allocations of output units to the institutions of the South African 
authors involved. This means, for example, that a significant collaborative paper written by 
a first-author South African with three other collaborators who work abroad, is awarded 
0.25 of a unit, while a paper by a single South African author in a local journal will ‘earn’ 
1.00 unit. Collaboration obviously has its own rewards of different kinds, but the policy could 
readily be modified by ignoring the foreign authorships and awarding units only to local 
authors, in which case the units awarded in the collaboration example would also be 1.00. 
Alternatively, and less controversially, only first local authorships of international collaborative 
papers might be recognised in this way.”
Despite these shortcomings, the funding formula has been successful in increasing the number of 
publications, with the number of research publications, as measured by publication units, growing 
from 6,660 in 2004 to 15,316 in 2014 (Butler-Adam, 2015), as shown in Figure 12. Interestingly the 
divergence between total article counts and publication units has also increased over the period 
due to the growing numbers of authors per publication (see Section 2.3) and hence the increasing 
extent of discounting due to the DHET’s approach of proportional measurement.
Figure 12. Total article counts and publication units (2005 to 2014)
Source: http://chet.org.za/data/sahe-open-data# and CREST
2.4.3 Performance Management of Individuals
International Practice
A thorough review of performance management systems for individual researchers presently 
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being applied within PRHEIs of other countries is beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
following important points are noted with respect to the contribution of publication counts to 
performance management systems:
 • Performance-based rewards relating to salary and promotion have been used in universities 
of the United States of America (USA) for many years (Stephan, 2012)
 • European and Asian universities have followed the USA example by implementing similar 
systems with mixed results (Kim and Bak, 2016; Andersen and Pallesen, 2008)
 • The range of incentives includes cash-per-paper payments, salary increases and cash bonuses 
(Andersen and Pallesen, 2008)
 • In South Korea, the universities have adopted a partial discount or non-proportional system 
for co-authored papers (Kim and Bak, 2016). For example, the author of a double-authored 
paper may receive 80% of the credit of a single-authored paper, or more recently, the first or 
corresponding author of a double-authored paper receives the same full credit as the author 
of a single-authored paper.
 • Also, in South Korea, the results of combining a non-proportional approach to co-authored 
publications, with an increase in the minimum publication requirements for promotion 
ensured an increase in the collaboration and hence co-authored publications. The influence 
of the cash bonus, however, was not considered to be significant (Kim and Bak, 2016). It 
was concluded from this study that scientists respond to organisational demands as may 
have been predicted by principal-agent theory and do not act as autonomous agents. In 
other words, a “well-designed team-based reward system could encourage organisational 
members to make extra effort to collaborate” (Kim and Bak, 2016:11).
Although the existing literature does reflect positive benefits to collaboration and co-authorship, 
there is also growing evidence of publication clubs and gift authorship, also known under the 
less complimentary terms of ghost authorship and by-line banditry (de Mesnard, 2017; Mouton, 
2017). These unethical practices, which are designed to exploit present incentive structures in 
the interest of maximising personal gain, are clearly an unintended and unfortunate outcome. A 
separate ASSAf study (ASSAf, 2018) is covering this topic.
South African Systems
Individual performance management at South African universities is a relatively recent and 
contentious phenomenon (Seyama and Smith, 2015; Ngcamu, 2013; Mapesela and Strydom, 
2007), although such systems have been used within the public research institutions (science 
councils) for more than 40 years. Academic staff within the universities are critical of such 
systems, their major concern being that performance management is a managerial practice 
developed for the business sector and highly unsuitable to the more collegial environment of 
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higher education. The critics consider its introduction to be a manifestation of the deepening 
culture and ideology of new public management, rather than a need to address productivity 
and performance weaknesses within their institutions. 
One important criticism made in a recent case study of a single university is the absence of 
a customised system more closely aligned to the organisation’s strategic plan. This aspect is 
important to our discussion since it links to the question of publication counts. It has been noted 
in Section 2.4.2 that South Africa PRHEIs are measured using publication units and not counts. 
The inference of this study is that the metric has been cascaded to the individual level, such that 
individual performance measurement depends on a fractional/proportional rather than integer-
based count of publications.
No evidence in support of this inference can be found in publicly available literature. However, 
based on documents obtained from the separate institutions, it has been possible to establish 
that in cases where at least a portion of the research output grant is transferred to faculty level, 
and then to departmental level, and finally to the research accounts of individual academics, 
such payments are made in proportion to publication units, as calculated by the DHET formula. 
It is likely that this approach is widespread within the PRHEIs although further research will be 
required to confirm this assertion.
The present system can be summarised as follows:
 • Publication units for individual authors, departments and faculties are rigorously counted, 
based on the subsidy formula as outlined in Section 2.4.2 for the submission of the data to the 
DHET.
 • The Research Office then uses these units to calculate the sum of money to be given to each 
faculty; the amount of money transferred depends on the institution but is usually between 
R10,000 and R50,000 per publication unit (this is about 10% to 50% of the original DHET payment 
per publication unit to the PRHEI). 
 • The faculty may or may not then take a percentage of the payments in order to promote 
research activities in their faculties.
 • The remainder is transferred to the departments, the heads of which can decide how it is, 
and how much is, transferred to the individual authors. In most cases, it appears that a portion 
is used to support young researchers and the final remainder is transferred to the research 
accounts of the authors by whom the publication units were earned. 
 • In some institutions, the individuals are allowed to draw the money as part of their taxable 
income, but this practice is not generally considered to be ethical within the system. Instead 
it is used to support the research needs of the individual academics.
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There are variants of the system which have been surfaced through this study. For instance, in 
its management of the National Facilities, the NRF uses an incentive instrument known as the 
‘Research and Innovation Reward Programme’. Each publication unit is allocated an amount of 
R60,000 (adjusted every few years), and the National Facility is then granted funding, additional 
to its core funding, in proportion to the number of publication units. According to the guidelines, 
the Managing Director of the facility is required to give an “undertaking that the award made 
for a specific output benefits the research of that individual or group, and that the money is used 
to support research activities relevant to the activities of the facility. At least 60% of the funds 
must directly benefit the individual researcher or research group and 40% of the funds may be 
allocated as discretionary funds for research activities relevant to the activities of the facility by 
the Managing Director”. (NRF, 2015)
However, there is one important and fundamental difference between the NRF instrument and 
the PRHEIs as outlined above. The NRF calculation applies the DHET formula of proportionality 
in that the calculation of the publication units is proportional to the number of authors, but only 
up to the level of 4 authors or 25% of the incentive. For publications by 5 authors and more, it is 
assumed that only 4 authors are involved. In other words, the value of the grant does not reduce 
below 25% of the initial grant of R60,000 per publication unit. This approach seems to deal more 
equitably with the issue of multiple co-authorships than the PRHEI approach, although it is clearly 
more expensive and more open to abuse with the use of ghost authorships and similar practices.
It is apparent from the above that the present system as adopted by many South African PRHEIs, with 
the exception of the National Facilities, for rewarding individual authors of research publications, 
uses proportional counting in the calculation of the value of the award. This system has the limitation 
that the value of the award becomes meaningless above a level of 5 to 10 authors.
The use of this system at the level of individuals is itself not supported by the DHET, whose Research 
Output Policy makes a number of relevant statements (DHET, 2015). This document notes that the:
“policy serves as a tool for the distribution of research subsidy to public HEIs in South Africa. The 
Department subsidises institutions and not individual authors or academics. Institutions should 
be cautious of directly incentivising individual authors as this practice is promoting perverse 
behaviour in some cases.”
The South African Institute of Physics has also noted its concern at the loss of publication units 
for papers involving the use of large-scale research infrastructure, work in large groups, research 
collaboration between groups, the development of international networks, and interdisciplinary 
research, where several research groups may combine (see Appendix D).
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2.4.4 Performance Management of Teams
Unfortunately, no data could be found on systems relating to the performance management of 
teams which would be of relevance to this study.
2.5 EXISTING APPROACHES TO RECOGNISING CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS WITHIN LARGE 
TEAMS
In Section 2.3, it has been noted that levels of co-authorship have risen significantly over the last 
half-century. In particular, there has been a shift from a median of 2 to a median of 4 co-authors 
in South African research publications with the major changes being a decrease in single/dual 
authorship and an increase in publications having between 4 and 10 co-authors. In addition, 
there has been the emergence of hyperauthorship, particularly in physics and astronomy, where 
papers containing more than 2,000 authors now comprise 20% of all publications in these two 
fields, although only 1% of the total annual publications.
Furthermore, Section 2.4 has indicated that the use of publication units as a measure of individual 
research performance, where the latter is linked directly to salary and promotion, may have 
become more widespread. These two trends, acting alongside each other, have resulted in the 
problem statement for this study, namely that publication units compute to minimal levels for 
large co-authorships and as a result the contribution of researchers to such projects or teams may 
be undervalued or poorly recognised.
In this section, existing approaches to the problem were reviewed. Unfortunately, on the main 
topic of the ASSAf study, namely the recognition within performance management systems of 
the contribution of individuals to the work of large teams, there is limited literature. However, 
there are some published studies on the utility and outcomes of incentives which have been 
aimed more broadly at the encouragement of collaboration, as discussed in Section 2.4.3.
Furthermore, there appears to be a similar dearth of publications on any organisation-specific 
standard procedures which may exist in organisations that routinely conduct research in large 
teams. It is therefore recommended that a phase of primary research should be undertaken in 
the event that ASSAf considers this topic to be worthy of further expenditure and investigation.
2.6 POTENTIAL SYSTEM REVISIONS TO ALLOW GREATER RECOGNITION
In this section, a number of new approaches as solutions to the problem statement of this study 
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are proposed. These ideas have emerged from the literature and from a deeper consideration 
of the parameters of the problem itself, based on information accessed through the literature.
Editors of journals and other authors have suggested several ways of improving the present system 
(Clement, 2014; Frische, 2012). These proposals can be divided into two main categories, namely 
the use of non-proportional publication units in performance measurement, and secondly more 
open disclosure of the role and responsibility of the different authors as listed on a publication. 
The two categories are now discussed in separate sections. 
2.6.1 Non-Proportional Publication Units: the Korean Model
The Korean model, which uses non-proportional publication units for incentivising collaboration in 
Korean universities, has already been discussed in Section 2.4.3 (Kim and Bak, 2016). This approach 
acknowledges that collaborations enhance the quantity and quality of research outputs, and 
hence it follows that it is in the interests of organisations to reward such collaborations in a non-
proportional manner, where the extent of the adjustment will depend on the perspectives and 
experience of the research organisation. Literature suggests that the enhancement is as high as 
40% on the average impact of non-collaborative publications (Ordóñez-Matamoros et al., 2010). 
In other words, the correction factor applied to the calculation of publication units will vary from 
1 to 1.4 as shown in Figure 13 (in this case a maximum enhancement of 80% has been assumed). 
Although this approach does increase the reward for co-authorships of publications having 
between two and ten authors, it does little for the main problem being considered in this study, 
namely the issue of large teams and publications with greater than 50 authors. In this case, a flat 
rate of publication units could be applied. In other words, the number of assigned units could be 
calculated on the following basis:
 
For X = 1
For X ≤ 10
For X ≥ 10
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where:
PU= publication units
X = number of authors
Pi = maximum publication unit for publication i
E = assumed level of enhancement (40% to 80%)
Figure 13. Proposed correction to PU for co-authorship at varying levels of E
A similar approach to non-proportional assignment of publication credits has recently been 
proposed by de Mesnard (2017). Arguing that a proportional allocation is too harsh, but that a 
system with no adjustment is too generous, de Mesnard proposes a “maximum parallelization 
credit” rule based on the following:
 
A comparison of the two methods is shown in Figure 14; the main difference is that the de Mesnard 
approach asymptotes to a higher ceiling value as the number of authors increases (0.35 vs. 0.27). 
Evidence in support of, and hence rationale for the adoption of, either value is still slim and further 
studies will be needed on the degree of enhancement which is afforded by large co-authorship 
for a choice to be made between the two values, or indeed any other value.
Although the approach of a minimum publication unit could be open to abuse, in practice the 
latter will be difficult in the presence of large teams and the growing practice of contribution 
disclosure. The adoption of a full disclosure approach as a means of assigning credits in a 
publication is outlined in the next section.
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Figure 14. Comparison of de Mesnard correction factor with this study
2.6.2 Contribution Matrix: Improving the Meaning of Co-Authorship
One of the central problems in the use of authorship as a performance metric is the interpretation 
of author lists and the lack of a uniform standard (Frische, 2012). It is evident that different disciplines 
and journals use different standards, with the list of authors sometimes being alphabetical, 
sometimes being in order of contribution and sometimes a mixture of both (Clement, 2014). A 
possible solution which has been explored and proposed in the literature is to include in the 
publication a matrix in which the contributions and responsibilities of an author to a specific 
article are listed.
Table 3 lists such an approach. Each author is required to define his/her level of input for the 
requisite article within the designated categories. These entries are then weighted using a set 
of institutional guidelines or the weightings as agreed between the authors. The final weighted 
contributions are then published with the list of authors; examples of possible values are given 
in Table 3. This approach also has the advantage that a minimum level of contribution can be 
assigned based on standard values or a pre-agreed threshold. For instance, a contribution level 
of less than 5% would not be sufficient to be listed as an author.
Table 3. Contribution matrix for assignment of co-authorship credits
Author Ideas Work Writing Stewardship Net Contribution/ 
Responsibility
Weighting 20% 30% 35% 15% 100%
A (Graduate Student) 10% 70% 50% 10% 42%
B (Post Doc) 20% 30% 25% 20% 25%
C (Professor) 70% 0% 25% 70% 33%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Such a system could have multiple impacts on the functioning of performance management systems 
and the recognition of research contributions in large teams. For instance, the transparency of the 
system may induce greater honesty, and improve the ethics culture of research (Frische, 2012). It 
may also allow for the allocation of publication units in proportion to the scale of effort, thereby 
reducing the level of under-recognition (or even over-recognition) in performance management.
2.6.3 Non-Bibliometric Methods
During the study, the panel’s attention was directed to the San Francisco DORA, developed by 
the American Society for Cell Biology (ASCB) in 2012 (see Appendix D). The guidelines rely on two 
themes, namely the need to eliminate the use of journal-based metrics, such as Journal Impact 
Factors, in funding, appointment, and promotion considerations; and the need to assess research 
on its own merits rather than on the basis of the journal in which the research is published.
Subsequently, the DORA movement has suggested methodologies for performance evaluation 
of researchers which do not rely on bibliometrics and is included in this section on account of its 
more authentic approach. 
2.7 CONCLUSION
The literature review has confirmed that levels of publication and co-authorship are indeed rising 
across all disciplines and countries. The number of research publications has increased by 354% 
over the period 1996 to 2015, and by 257% between 2005 and 2015. Over the latter period the 
pattern of authorship has changed in three major respects. Firstly, the number of single-authored 
papers has fallen from 21% to 9% of the total output, and the median number of authors per 
paper has risen from 2 to 4. Secondly the incidence of international co-authorship has risen from 
60% to 70% of all publications, a trend which can only be described as a positive sign for a small 
research system. Finally, and of particular importance to this study, the log-normal distribution has 
shifted to a bimodal pattern with the emergence of a relatively large number of publications in 
the category of 1,000 to 5,000 co-authors.
It is also apparent that the growth of hyperauthored papers has emerged in a very specific set 
of disciplines and is not widespread within the system. Furthermore, there is limited published 
evidence that proportional measurement is a widely-used approach within South African HEIs. 
Different institutions, and within each institution, different disciplines adopt different measures 
and targets for salary adjustments and promotion.
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Researchers are not autonomous agents as may be asserted by some perspectives of this sector; 
they are influenced by recognition-for-performance systems in a similar way to that reported 
for other employees (Bak, 2016; Stephan, 2012). The framework and insights of principal-agent 
theory are as applicable to the research sector as for other environments and the structure of 
performance management systems is important in the optimal contribution of researchers to the 
objectives of their institutions. It is therefore of critical importance that such systems are both fair 
and well-directed. They must drive the most desirable behaviours and provide an environment 
which meets the needs of both the researchers and the institutions within which they are employed. 
Based on initial information, it was apparent to the panel that the principles of fairness and 
direction were presently not the case. In the next chapter of this study, the opinions of researchers 
on the existing system were surveyed in order to inform the panel as to whether and what type 
of response was required.
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3.1 METHODOLOGY OF THE ASSIGNMENT
The survey was undertaken by the SciSTIP as part of a broader study on ‘researcher’s experiences 
of academic and scientific authorship in South Africa’, with the partial support of ASSAf. Further 
details are available in Appendix B.
The questions which were included in the survey as part of this project are given in the text 
box. Full details on the methodology and the conclusions for the broader study will be published 
separately by SciSTIP (date of publication has not been released).
Currently in South Africa the DHET administers a system of incentivising and rewarding peer-
reviewed publications by university-affiliated authors. One of the key aspects of the system 
is that the subsidy amounts for a specific publication unit (journal article or book chapter) 
is proportionally allocated to individual authors (for example, three authors from three 
different SA universities each qualify for 0.33 of the subsidy amount)
The present 
system of 
proportional 
reward is fair 
and equitable
Proportional 
reward 
prevents 
researchers 
from co-
publishing
Proportional 
reward is 
unfair to large 
collaborations 
(> 50 co-
authors)
Question
RESPONDENTS’ VIEWS OF PROPORTIONAL REWARDS FOR PUBLICATIONS
Strongly 
agree
Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree
Strongly 
disagree
CHAPTER 3. STUDY ON THE ATTITUDES OF 
RESEARCHERS TOWARDS PUBLICATION 
INCENTIVE: IS PROPORTIONAL COUNTING A 
FAIR SYSTEM?
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3.2 RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY QUESTIONS
3.2.1 Demographics of the Respondents
967 responses were obtained from a database of more than 20,000 authors. In general, the 
profile of respondents appears to reflect a high response from senior level researchers within the 
universities (few responses were received from science councils or other public institutions, such 
as the museums). As shown in Figure 15, the gender balance (58% male) was considered to be 
reasonable in the light of the present demographics of the academic population. 
Interestingly, the majority of respondents had more than 20 publications and were more than 
40 years old, reflecting a disproportionate commitment to participating in the survey (the older 
and more experienced academics are more invested in the outcome?) as shown in Figure 16. 
In other words, responses were received from a cohort of experienced academics with interest 
in the publication incentive, or perhaps more broadly in the university/science council system. 
Figure 15. Gender profile of respondents
Figure 16. Profile of respondents by age and number of publications
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Interestingly, the responses were evenly distributed by discipline or research field, as shown in 
Figure 17. Due the large number of reported research fields (67), the data was agglomerated 
into eight broader categories; the latter categories were based on the conventional faculty 
structures within universities, with the exception of the category ‘Chemical and Engineering 
Sciences’ which covered both chemical sciences and engineering. The reason for not including 
chemical sciences in the category of ‘Mathematical, IT and Physical Sciences’ was to isolate a 
single group where it is understood from the initial literature review that the practice of multiple or 
large co-authorship is more prevalent.
Figure 17. Profile of respondents by research field
3.2.2 Respondent’s Evaluation of the System
In answer to the statement ‘the present system of proportional reward is fair and equitable’, 79% 
of the respondents did not disagree with the statement, as shown in Figure 18 (55% agreed or 
strongly agreed with this statement).  This result is somewhat surprising, given the rationale and 
problem statement for the ASSAf study and the perceived level of dissatisfaction with the present 
system across the respondents was low). However, some of the respondents who agreed with 
the statement that the present system is fair, also considered, somewhat contradictory, that the 
system acts as a barrier to co-publication or is unfair to large collaborations. In order to elucidate 
in more detail the disciplinary profile of respondents who held such contradictory views, or indeed 
which disciplines may feel the present system to be unfair, the responses were further analysed.
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Figure 18. Response to the statement on ‘fair and equitable’
Figure 19. Response to the question on ‘barrier to co-publishing’
However, this feedback is contradicted by the responses to the two subsequent questions 
which asked for input on the two key statements of ‘proportional reward prevents researchers 
from co-publishing’ and ‘proportional reward unfair to large co-authorships’, both of which 
scored similarly on the Likert scale (average responses 3.1 and 3.4 respectively). In other words, 
although the respondents consider the present system to be fair and equitable, they recognise 
or acknowledge that it acts as a barrier to co-publishing and it is unfair to large co-authorships.
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Figure 20. Response to the question on impact on ‘large collaborations’
In order to resolve this contradiction, a limited amount of cross-tabulation has also been attempted. 
For instance, it is possible to ask the question of ‘if the respondent considers the present system 
to be fair and equitable’, is the same respondent more likely to disagree with the statement 
that the system acts as a barrier to collaboration and co-authorship. Although there are some 
trends, these are not clear and consistent. This contradiction is evident even at a segregated 
level of analysis. For instance, 29% of those who strongly agree or agree with the fairness of the 
present system (the latter being 55% of the total respondents) also agree with the statement 
that it prevents authors from co-publishing; similarly, only 64% of those who strongly disagree or 
disagree with the fairness of the present system (the latter being 22% of total respondents) agree 
that it is unfair to large collaborations.
These results do suggest, however, that there may be support at the researcher level for changes to 
the system which could address the barriers to large collaborations. This initial conclusion from the 
survey could form the basis for the third round of the ASSAf project, covering the semi-structured 
interviews with DVCs on the main topic of incentives for large collaborations and co-authorships.
3.2.3 Disaggregation by Research Field
In the next part of this analysis, an attempt has been made to understand the contradictory 
nature of the responses, as outlined in the introduction. The contradiction is apparent, namely 
that a system which is fair and equitable (answer to Q1) cannot simultaneously not prevent co-
authorship (Q2) and be unfair to large collaborations (Q3). Since the initial analysis was completed 
on the aggregated data, it is possible that the responses are consistent at a disaggregated level; 
as a consequence, the analysis was repeated based on research field.
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The results to the three survey questions are shown in Figure 21, Figure 22 and Figure 23. It is concluded 
from the figures that there is no confirmation that researchers in the field of ‘Mathematical, IT and 
Physical Sciences’ are the most likely to consider the system to be unfair and disadvantageous 
to multiple co-authorships. Indeed, it is the respondents from the category of ‘Health Sciences’ 
who are the most disaffected with the present system, particularly in respect of its fairness to large 
collaborations (see Figure 24).
Figure 24 is probably the most insightful representation of the data within this phase of the analysis. 
The analysis was compiled by agglomerating the responses within the Likert categories ‘Agree’ 
and ‘Strongly Agree’ into a single category of ‘Agree’ and similarly the categories ‘Disagree’ 
and ‘Strongly Disagree’ into ‘Disagree’. The figure shows that there is at least some consistency 
in the responses by research field. For instance, respondents from the Health Sciences have the 
highest level of dissatisfaction with the present system and agreed most strongly that it was unfair 
to large collaborations. Similarly, researchers in the category ‘Agricultural, Earth and Marine 
Sciences’ have a comparatively high level of disaffection with the fairness of the present system 
and consider that it prevents co-publication or is unfair to large collaborations.
Figure 21. Responses to ‘fair and equitable’ by research field (Q1)
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Figure 22. Responses to ‘prevents co-publication’ by research field (Q2)
Figure 23. Responses to ‘unfair to large collaborations’ by research field (Q3)
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Figure 24. Agglomerated responses to Q1, 2 and 3 by research field
The anomalies in this trend are certainly the categories of ‘Mathematical, IT and Physical 
Sciences’ and ‘Economics and Management Sciences’, where fewer respondents disagree with 
the statement that the system is fair and do not on the whole agree that it is unfair towards large 
collaborations. Perceptions about overall system fairness and specific ways in which it acts to 
disincentivise large collaborations or co-publication are clearly more complex than has been 
assumed in this survey. Further qualitative work is required to explore these aspects of the system.
3.2.4 Disaggregation by Number of Publications
In the final part of this analysis, the responses were disaggregated according to the number 
of publications of the respondent. As shown in Figure 24, there is little variation between the 
different categories, suggesting that level of experience with the system does not determine the 
perceptions of the respondent in terms of fairness and equity. Similar patterns were noted for the 
other two key questions of the survey (Q2 and Q3).
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Figure 25. Responses to Q1 disaggregated by number of publications
3.3 QUALITATIVE RESPONSES
The survey also provided the opportunity for respondents to comment on the survey and how 
the system could be changed to address its shortcomings. A sample of these suggestions now 
follows:
3.3.1 Comments on the Overall System
“The proportional award concept lends itself to cutting out authors that may have contributed to 
papers, just so that the proportion allocation increases in favour of those authors who have been 
credited. Other contributors are then relegated to the acknowledgments section.”
 “In my practice, all participants add his/her knowledge and work to the project, which is usually 
interdisciplinary (organic chemist, radiochemist, analytical chemist, veterinarian, PET imager, 
nuclear physicist), it means everybody must be counted as full member, without any of them the 
publication cannot be realised. However, it is true that ‘we are publishing in small group, with 6-7 
authors as maximum’.”
“Yes. The University runs on this reward and funds research through infrastructure. That is 
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why I support it. I DO NOT support linking it to the high-end journals because it means fewer 
publications. I strive to get PhD and MSc to learn how to do research that benefits SOUTH AFRICA 
so don’t like them publishing in European Union (EU) and USA journals that are too expensive 
for our libraries and academics. The ‘high end journals’ are only for top end academics who 
want to get famous, not for those of us who want to do local research to meet the needs of 
local students and communities and our own country.”
“My experience is that the way the DHET subsidy is apportioned has little effect on authorship 
decisions. I found that individual career building played a more significant role.”
“This system affects different disciplines and research groups differently. I have on several 
occasions been pressured by collaborators to REMOVE STUDENT AUTHORS from the papers in 
order to increase their personal take. This system incentivises the disenfranchisement of student 
and postdoctoral researchers who have not yet achieved the professional leverage to fight 
for their rights!”
“The proportional allocation is not well understood, at least in my University research division. I 
publish regularly, with a student/s and with overseas collaborators. We only receive an amount 
according to our proportion of all authors, even though the other authors could be all from 
foreign institutions.”
“I think the whole idea undermines the values that are necessary to maintain scientific integrity 
and healthy collaborations.”
“The proportional system gives the bully academics a licence to continue being bullies. Make 
them justify their contribution and account for it.”
“I know it is a difficult issue, but I still think that it hinders collaboration. Maybe the amount 
of money per publication can be increased when multiple authors are involved and then 
proportionally divided. Fact of the matter is, from an incentive point of view, it is better to publish 
solo, while collaborative research is actually the better way to go from a purely academic 
viewpoint. On the other hand, collaborative research can lead to more publications, thereby 
negating the negative effects of smaller incentives.”
“Is the present system of proportional reward fair and equitable? This depends on the actual 
contribution of each author’s contribution (concept vs. data collection vs. writing of the article, 
vs. editing. vs. etc. ....) to the publication, which is not easy to quantify. Thus, the present system 
is fair and easy to implement.”
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“There will never be a system that is completely fair. The current system is simple, transparent 
and a good incentive to promote research despite it having certain drawbacks. We should be 
happy that we have such a system.”
“These questions and their answers are not clear cut.  1. A proportional system is fair to an extent 
– although the primary author (by definition) in many cases will have done a greater proportion 
of the work.  2. Proportional rewards may prevent co-authoring. However, authorship should 
not be defined based on monetary reward – monetary reward (as is the case currently) may 
lead to certain co-authors being added who do not meet the criteria for having contributed. 
On the other hand, where proportional rewarding results in reduced co-authoring, there may 
be some contributors who are unfairly excluded from authorship. Ultimately, the authors should 
all be deserving of authorship, and no contributors who are deserving of authorship should 
be excluded. This should be the case regardless of financial incentive.  3. In the case of > 50 
authors, many (if not most) of these authors have probably not contributed sufficiently to the 
paper in the first place, to warrant authorship. Therefore, proportional financial reward is the 
sacrifice that they must make for having a paper with > 50 authors.  Ultimately, one manuscript 
is likely to have the same amount of impact, regardless of the number of authors (if all else 
e.g. impact factor of the journal, remains equal). Therefore, there is absolutely no reason why 
there should not be a fixed amount for a paper (e.g. at a set impact factor), regardless of the 
number of authors.”  
“We are encouraged to collaborate with other universities but punished at the same time.”
“Does anyone really deserve an incentive if you are one of 50 co-authors? What on earth could 
each one have contributed? I am strongly against an author’s list that looks like a telephone 
directory. Otherwise I am happy with proportional reward. It does however influence one in 
choosing co-authors.”
3.3.2 Comments on Alternative Approaches
“The contributors’ effort should be weighed by the contributors and rewards should be given in 
suitable proportion. This must be agreed on by the authors after the article is published.”
“I think the number of authors does not matter … what matters is the impact factor.”
“The last question is a bit silly. NO article (ever) should have that many authors. If that is the 
case then the authors need to have a look at the author guidelines, whichever ones they 
use. Or perhaps obtain some guidelines, since that many authors could not possibly have 
contributed equally.”
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“Proportional reward should be based on the number of authors and also their contributions”
“As I understand this model is actually part of the funding-model to channel money to 
universities for training students, one of the reasons it is not extended to science councils. I can 
see that it can cause pressure as well as substantial acrimony and has vast potential for being 
unfairly implemented. The only way I see around it would be to stop it entirely and change the 
funding of Universities.”
“Researchers need to first of all think about the interest of their research before thinking about 
the monetary rewards. It’s about research, its goals and objectives rather than the rewards.”
“First authors should receive a higher proportion than co-authors.”
“I think researchers should NOT be motivated by incentives. Instead they should be motivated 
by quality of their research as judged by the impact factor of the journal in which they publish 
and also acceptability of their work by others (as measured by number of citations).   If a large 
number of authors is necessary to make authors a publication of high impact, with high quality 
data, then that is fine. Reduced incentive gains per author should not de-motivate the many 
authors in a single publication.”
“Finally, if the incentive funding value is related to impact factor of the journal, this would 
likely encourage better papers, that are of a collaborative nature to ensure that they are 
acceptable in higher impact factor journals. This should also prevent or reduce the incidence 
of ‘salami slicing’.”
“It does seem as if researchers get penalised for collaborating. I feel there is scope for abuse 
here, especially in terms of academics removing postgraduates as authors where their data 
is used. We should be encouraging collaboration, and getting as many young scientists to 
publish their work as possible. Ironically, changing the system to one where each author is 
rewarded equally, irrespective of number of authors, will lead to alternative problems, where 
co-authors are added merely to raise more funds within a research group.”
“I would prefer the incentive system to take quality as well as quantity into account. Use of a 
sliding scale of rewards, based on journal impact factors (or some similar metric), would seem 
to be beneficial.”
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3.4 CONCLUSION
It has been established using a population-wide survey that although the present system of 
proportional counting is considered on average to be fair and equitable, it prevents multiple co-
authorships and acts as a barrier to large co-authorship. 
The analysis has revealed firstly that responses were obtained from a wide range of research 
fields, indicating that the survey is widely represented across the different disciplines within the 
universities and public research institutions (national facilities and science councils). Secondly 
a large proportion (>75%) of the respondents are experienced researchers within the system, 
having more than 20 publications and being over the age of 40.
Disaggregation of the responses to the three core questions of the study (Q1 – ‘Is the system fair 
and equitable?’, Q2 – ‘Does proportional reward prevent researchers from co-publishing?’ and 
Q3 – ‘Is proportional reward unfair to large collaborations?’) indicates that the highest level of 
disaffection with the present system lies in the Health Sciences, with respondents in this category 
also agreeing to some extent with Q2 and Q3. In other words, there is a level of internal consistency 
within this research field.
However, the results for the category ‘Mathematical, IT and Physical Sciences’ are surprising, 
with fewer respondents disagreeing with the statement that the system is fair and mostly not 
considering that it is unfair towards large collaborations. Perceptions about overall system fairness 
and specific ways in which it acts to disincentivise large collaborations or co-publication are 
clearly more complex than has been assumed in this survey. Further qualitative work is required 
to explore these aspects of the system.
Most of the more quantitative results from the survey, as presented in this document, are 
supported by the qualitative comments which were collected as part of the survey. Some of the 
respondents have indicated that the present system is simple and fair, whereas others question 
its integrity and beneficial influence on research outcomes. Alternative suggestions include the 
incorporation of quality factors on the publication incentive and the weighting of proportional 
counting based on the individual author’s actual contribution. However, it is also clear that the 
system is inconsistently implemented and that there are varying degrees of understanding in 
terms of its actual operation. Both issues could be beneficially addressed at institutional level 
given a willingness to support the research system and the way in which co-authorship patterns 
are changing.
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4.1 METHODOLOGY OF THE ASSIGNMENT
4.1.1 Population and Sample
The population for this study is all the South African PRHEIs (universities and research-performing 
science councils). Since it was impractical for the task team to adopt a comprehensive sampling 
strategy and interview all the senior research executives in the population, a partly purposive and 
partly convenience strategy was adopted as follows:
 • The HEIs were ranked according to their 2015 publication units (see Figure 26).
 • Five of the top eight HEIs were selected for the sample (University of Cape Town (UCT), University 
of Witwatersrand (Wits), Stellenbosch University (SU), UP, and University of Johannesburg (UJ)).
 • Two science councils (the CSIR and the Medical Research Council) and two further HEIs 
(University of Western Cape (UWC) and Durban University of Technology (DUT)) were added 
to the list in order to obtain a broader perspective on the core issue of proportional publication 
counts as a performance or reward measure.
Figure 26. Publication units for South African HEIs (2015)
Of this sample, one HEI declined to be interviewed and the interview with UWC was repeated 
with two different respondents as a consequence of changes at the Executive level. All other 
interviews were completed as per the schedule. 
4.1.2 Data Collection and Analysis
Five of the nine interviews were recorded and transcribed; the remainder were reported in the 
form of written replies to the questions, in each case completed by the interviewer. Although 
CHAPTER 4. QUALITATIVE SURVEY ON THE USE 
OF PROPORTIONAL PUBLICATION COUNTS IN 
PUBLIC RESEARCH AND HEIS AS A RESEARCH 
INCENTIVE
 
Source: CHET, 2018  
 
2 000
1 600
1 200
800
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
Un
its
400
0
RECOGNISING INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH: 
Limitations of Proportional Publication Counts and Proposals for Alternatives58
the names and institutional associations of the interviewees were recorded, such details have 
not been disclosed here and all quotes/discussions of the material have been reported on an 
anonymous basis, as is standard practice for surveys of this kind.
Once the interviews had been completed, and the transcriptions or written replies had been 
received, the documents were coded using ATLAS.ti (Friese, 2014), with the codes and the 
coding structure being pre-specified according to the overall analytical framework for the study, 
as described in the following section. 
4.1.3 Analytical Framework
The analytical framework for this study was informed by two separate perspectives. In the first 
instance, the study used a modified version of the Precaution Adoption Process Model which 
was originally developed as a cognitive behavioural model to describe the process from 
awareness to action (Weinstein et al., 2008). The modified version, as developed for this study, 
defines five distinct stages as shown in Figure 27, and refers specifically to the question of whether 
and how institutions should respond to the impact of the DHET system, and particularly its use of 
proportional counting, on the recognition of researchers who publish their work within articles 
with large numbers of co-authors. 
Figure 27. Stages of the Precaution Adoption Model
Source: Adapted from Weinstein et al, 2008
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Secondly, the framework separated the analysis of performance management, and its 
associated impact on funding, into two distinct levels, namely the institutional and the individual 
levels (see Figure 28). This separation was critical as a means of understanding the reason that 
the institutional-level framework is applied at the level of the individual and the extent or depth 
of this application.
The use of publication counts as a metric of both institutional and individual performance 
measurement, and particular proportional counting, also referred to as publication equivalents, 
starts with the DHET but cascades to all levels within the HEIs. It is applied as a means of calculating 
the annual DHET transfers to individual universities through its funding formula (Level 1 in Figure 
28); it is adopted in some cases as a means of assessing faculty performance (Level 2 in Figure 
28); and it is widely applied as a metric for the performance measurement and management of 
individual academics/researchers (Level 3 in Figure 28).
Figure 28. Institutional and individual performance management/funding system for HEIs
Although it may be relevant, it is noted that in this study there has been little focus on the practices 
of Level 2; all of the discussion in the document relates to Levels 1 and 3 only. The aggregation 
of Levels 1 and 2 from the perspective of the researcher means that some information in terms 
of the diversity of performance management within PRHEIs has been lost. However, this decision 
has been necessary in order to allow the study to focus on its main objective, namely how the 
present system of proportional counting may disincentivise collaboration and co-authorship in 
large teams.
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is shown in Table 4. The questions and the codes were grouped according to the stages of 
the precaution adoption model (Weinstein et al., 2008) and the transcripts were then coded 
according to the code descriptors as indicated in this table. Although the approach seems 
somewhat contrived, the structure has been useful in consolidating all the responses within their 
relevant sections within what is essentially a complex network of performance management/
incentive instruments and employee hierarchies within institutions. The results of the analysis are 
presented in the next section.
Table 4. Structure of coding with examples of questions
Code Group Code Descriptor as Applied
Level of 
Application
Directly 
Relevant 
to Co-
Authorship
Example of Question  
(ex-Questionnaire)
Awareness and 
Implementation
Distribution 1, 2 and 3 N
Is the monetary award attached 
to publication counts, as received 
by your institution as part of 
the DHET funding, retained at 
a central level, or devolved 
to faculties, departments, 
individual research accounts and 
researchers?
Examples of 
Utilisation of 
Central Funds
1, 2 and 3 N  
Diversity 2 N
Do different faculties within your 
university adopt different practices 
in terms of the monetary award? 
If so, please give two examples of 
the approaches.
Performance 
Management 3 N
Is the system of publication counts, 
as defined by the DHET framework, 
used as a means of performance 
management within your 
university, either at a faculty level, 
or department level, or the level of 
the individual academic?
Strategic Goals 1 N  
Operational 
Management 1 N
Is the metric irrelevant to the 
operational management within 
your university, other than as a 
means of calculating the DHET 
grant?
Examples of 
Implementation 2 N  
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Code Group Code Descriptor as Applied
Level of 
Application
Directly 
Relevant 
to Co-
Authorship
Example of Question  
(ex-Questionnaire)
Acknowledgement 
and General 
Perception
Overall Support of 
System 1 N  
General 
Perception on 
DHET System
1  Open code
Impact on Output 2 and 3 N
In your opinion, does the system 
of publication counts and hence 
proportional counting enhance 
the research output of the 
university?
Misappropriation 3 N
Are you aware of misappropriation 
by individual academics, as 
claimed recently by Muller (2017)? 
If so, how common is this practice. 
Fair and Equitable 2 and 3 Y
What do you think of the 
approach of proportional 
counting?
Treatment of 
Proportionality 3 Y  
Proportionality 
and Promotion 3 Y
Is proportionality considered 
as important in selection and 
promotion 
Acknowledge and 
Collaboration –
 Specific 
Perception
Barrier to 
Collaboration 1, 2 and 3 Y
What are your perceptions of the 
DHET system as it is applied to 
universities, with specific reference 
to the case of large collaborations 
and co-authorship (>50 authors)?
Barrier Justifiable 1, 2 and 3 Y  
Large 
Collaboration 
Other Benefits
1, 2 and 3 Y Open code
Barrier @ Level 3 3 Y If the DHET approach of 
proportional counting is applied 
at the level of individual 
performance management within 
your university or institution, do you 
consider it to be disadvantageous 
to such collaborations?
Barrier @ Level 4 3 Y
Need to System 
Response 1 Y
If so, do you think this is a problem 
of sufficient importance that it 
needs a system-level response?
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Code Group Code Descriptor as Applied
Level of 
Application
Directly 
Relevant 
to Co-
Authorship
Example of Question  
(ex-Questionnaire)
Engagement and 
Action
Can it be 
Changed? 0 Y
Could the system of proportional 
accounting be changed to 
provide greater recognition to 
large collaborations?
Recommendation 
DHET 0 Y
What recommendations should be 
made to the DHET?
Recommendation 
ASSAf 0 Y
What do you recommend to 
ASSAf in terms of the study’s 
objectives?
Changes Being 
Considered? 1 Y
Is the university considering any 
changes to the way in which the 
system has been implemented? 
Example of 
Changes Being 
Considered
1 N If so, how will it be changed?
4.2 RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
4.2.1 Awareness and Implementation
Based on their replies in the interview, all the respondents were aware of the two important issues 
being discussed, namely the use of proportional counting as a means of increasing research 
outputs, and its specific application to large co-authorships. Furthermore, their current practices 
with respect to these two issues reflect broad implementation of the DHET funding formula. 
In further assessing the institution-specific variants for publication incentive, the study considered 
the aspects of distribution (the extent to which DHET funding for publication units is retained 
centrally or distributed to faculty or individuals); diversity (differences in the way in which faculties 
manage the proportion allocated to them); whether proportional publication counts were used 
for performance management; and finally, whether this metric was used in strategic/operational 
management.
The responses to these questions are now reported.
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4.2.2 Distribution
All HEIs in the sample retain at least a portion of the DHET funding centrally whilst distributing the 
remainder to faculties and individual researchers. Practices in terms of the quantum or proportion 
of funding retained centrally and the proportion distributed to faculty and individuals vary widely 
across institutions. In the extreme, one institution retains as much as 90% of the funding received 
centrally, whereas at the other extreme up to 50% is distributed to faculties and individual 
researchers. 
With one exception, funding distributed to individual researchers is paid to their research accounts. 
In the exceptional case, some of the funding allocated to individual academics can be earned 
as taxable income with the aim of incentivising progress towards the institution’s strategic goals 
to “increase the number of NRF-rated researchers and research publication outputs, with 
particular reference to those published in high impact international journals, those produced 
in collaboration with distinguished international researchers, and research publications that are 
generated via Masters and Doctoral studies”. In this case the proportion that can be earned as 
taxable income rises in proportion to the standing of the researcher (in terms of their NRF rating) 
and the standing of the journal in which an article was published. 
Where funding is allocated to individual academics, the proportionality inherent in the DHET 
system cascades to the individual academics. Academics are therefore allocated a portion of 
the funding received equal to the funding divided by the number of authors in accordance with 
the DHET system.  One respondent indicated that where students are co-authors their component 
would be allocated to the supervisor’s research account. This aspect was not specifically surveyed 
but presumably similar arrangements exist at other institutions.
Science councils do not receive funding from DHET for publication counts and hence there is no 
distribution of funding in the sense that this is done at HEIs. However, in one of the two science 
councils surveyed, the DHET publication count system is used at several levels in the organisation 
and for several purposes as part of the operational management of the institution. In this case 
the system has an impact on the parliamentary grant allocation to units within the science 
council and is a factor in the promotion and remuneration of individual researchers. The effect of 
proportionality within these measures is mixed, with some measures such as career ladders being 
counted proportionally and others being independent of the number of authors.
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4.2.3 Use of Proportional Count in Performance Management
 
It appears that the proportional counts are widely used as a means of incentivising scholarly 
publications. In six of the institutions, this metric explicitly forms part of the reward structure for 
individual academics. In the remaining cases the institutions either do not have an explicit 
performance management system, or the institution’s emphasis is on ‘performance development’ 
rather than performance management, or a publication count of some form is used but not 
exactly according to the DHET formula. 
In terms of the more nuanced aspects of implementation, several respondents indicated the 
importance of quality, as measured by impact, over quantity in academic publishing.
“The emphasis is much more on the quality of the product than the number. So, none of 
our promotion criteria for example in the academic space, none of that is based on the 
number of units or the number of the publications.” 
And: 
“We do count publications but, as mentioned already, we focus on impact and not simply 
on the number of publications.”
The respondents emphasised that their institutions avoided allowing the publication count to 
drive quantity over quality and employed various mechanisms to guard against this possibility 
including peer review of quality and the use of impact factors such as the h-Index. One of the 
respondents sounded a warning of the potential unintended consequences of implementing 
publication count as a major incentive in a mechanistic manner: 
“I mean if we had to like 50% going into the pocket of someone, that would change the 
behaviour of people and I think negatively because they start to cut their papers up slice 
them, put them into any kind of journal, etc.”
4.2.4 Strategic and Operational Management
In contrast to the view that funding flowing to individuals was too small to significantly alter 
publishing behaviour, the total magnitude of funding received by the institution through the DHET 
system can be substantial. Its impact on strategic and operational management of the institution 
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can therefore be significant and it is seen as crucial to the financial viability of HEIs. The funding 
that is retained centrally is utilised in varied and unique ways and it has become an important 
funding source as indicated by the following responses: 
“They understand that that money that’s in the main budget contributes to our first and 
second stream income which eventually then pays their salaries and balances the books of 
the university. There is this one way in which the university actually gets their money.”
“It is important for the following: If we have, say for argument sake, a certain percentage of 
our staff that never publishes, it’s a problem, because every academic actually has, in very 
hard terms, has an economic value. Now they have to earn twice their own salary in a year. 
The only way they can do that, is to publish papers, to graduate Masters and PhD students, 
and to lecture at an undergraduate level. It would very difficult if you look at the (funding 
formula) to earn your salary just purely based on undergraduate teaching.”
Consistent with the earlier discussion on proportional count in performance management, 
funding retained centrally is used to promote research output and quality:
“Some percentage of the money goes to what we call the incentive fund, which is divided 
into the international conferences where you as a researcher can apply every second year 
to attend an international conference and we pay for your flight and registration.”
And:
“We have a research incentive system.”
Centrally retained DHET funding is applied to support the publication process:
“Then we also have a category where we allocate page fees, some of the money goes 
to, so that we pay for page fees in these journals that cost lots of dollars these days, so we 
cover that in terms of the authors.”
And to support emerging researchers:
“We have what we are calling start-up funds for researchers where they can apply for the 
R30,000 to be able to start their research.”
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4.3 GENERAL PERCEPTIONS
In addition to reviewing implementation practices, the general perception of the DHET publication 
count was surveyed. In terms of overall support of the system only a minority of respondents 
expressed a negative perception of the system overall.  
4.3.1 Impact on Research Output
The respondents’ view on whether the system impacted positively or negatively on research 
output was mixed. One respondent stated that:
“It does enhance the system in South Africa. I think it has played an important role in lifting 
science in South Africa, and specifically scientific output as measured by peer review 
papers. There is no doubt, all the figures show that. So that’s a good thing.” 
And: 
 
“When the system was introduced it had its value in terms of making sure that at least all 
institutions were getting some portion of this pie.”
On the other hand, some respondents felt that the magnitude of the funding to individual 
researchers had become so small that it was less likely to be a significant factor in driving publishing 
behaviour. 
“And ... the academics A-rated, B-rated scientists and so on, don’t even care about that 
10%, nothing. What they want to do is they want to build their CV. … And the way to build 
that reputation is do it with good quality publications, simple as that. What I do think should 
happen to... you know at the DHET level, would be to reduce the list of the journals that they 
actually subsidise.”
The majority were, however, of the view that the system had a positive impact on research output.
4.3.2 Misappropriation
 
Misappropriation does not appear to be a major concern amongst the respondents. Although 
most respondents indicated awareness of the issue, the checks on this are best illustrated by the 
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following response which indicates that the system is self-correcting: “Well they will... that fine, 
because the only thing that will happen is, they will damage their own reputation. …the system 
sorts itself out. They will realise that they will not get promoted, they will realise that those papers 
don’t get cited and in the long run, they are actually undermining their own careers.”
4.3.3 Fairness and Equitability 
The majority of respondents had some concerns about the fairness and equitability of the current 
systems. Concerns regarding this aspect were not consistent across respondents with different 
respondents emphasising different issues. 
For instance, respondents pointed out that:
“It is not a fair system which is why we largely do not use it.” 
And: 
“It is not fair and equitable where senior staff are included in the list of authors where they 
have made minimal contributions, especially in comparison with young staff.” 
Whereas another emphasised that:
“You would have noticed as the publication outputs of the Higher Education Sectors 
increase, the money per unit has dropped. Because the financial pool has not increased, 
a number of units has increased, so the numerator has remained, remained the same, the 
denominator increased, so the fraction has dropped.” 
And:
“See it from the perspective of the researchers. … here I am doing this work all on my own, 
within the South African environment and I produce this piece of work and half of this work 
has been done by somebody else in another part of the world, it is not a South African, not 
working within the challenging environment in which you are working. Yet you are rewarding 
him (for) his collaboration, this component is unfair to me.” 
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4.3.4 Treatment of Proportionality vis-a-vis Promotion
Proportionality has negative consequences for researchers in terms of disbursement of DHET as 
“the bigger the amount of authors the less credit you get”. It appears that the HEIs accept this 
consequence in terms of funding to academics but are more sanguine or cautious when it is used 
for promotion. In this case, the respondents consistently indicated that proportionality would not 
disadvantage researchers who published a high number of publications annually but accrued 
low or zero publication units due to the high number of co-authors. 
One respondent stated that: 
“Such an academic would not be frowned upon or ignored, especially if involved in 
international collaborations.” 
Institutions took a broader view when evaluating the research component of an academic’s 
performance for promotion purposes: 
“The number of collaborations and the journal impact factors of publications would be 
used: for example, a 1000 author paper in Science cannot be ignored. Individuals are asked 
to convey these cases in their Performance Evaluations.” 
Impact was raised as an important consideration: 
“We would be impressed by his or her h-index. We would not be bothered if the scientist got 
very little credit, but we would be impressed if the journal had a high impact factor and the 
scientist was first or last author.”
4.4 PERCEPTION OF THE IMPACT OF PROPORTIONAL COUNTING ON COLLABORATION
The impact of proportional counting on collaboration was assessed in terms of its consequences 
at the individual level as well as at the institutional level. On balance, proportional counting is 
seen as a barrier to participation in large collaborations as seen from these responses:
“It is counterproductive because if you use that [indistinct] by just dividing by the number 
they see it is, you know, if we work in this group of 10 you will get less.”
“Some may ask why they should work so hard to prove their contribution [**and this may be 
regarded as a barrier].”
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However, a more nuanced view provided by some of the respondents indicates that in practice 
the apparent barrier to collaboration resulting from the reduced direct financial incentive is 
tempered by other considerations:
“…even though the proportion counting is kind of countering the collaborative effect, on 
the other hand it still brings in money into the institution that allows for, in our case, our 
context, broader use of the money, if you hear what I am saying. Because that R120 000 or 
whatever proportion that comes in, even though you are not publishing per se, or you do 
publish, you get your R12 000 but me, I can still apply.”
“It would seem so. If our scientists didn’t collaborate because of the funding implications, 
that would be a negative. The science has to be more important than the money”.
An interesting institutional response to the disincentive to participation in large collaborations is 
provided by the following response: 
“So what we did we collected them and we made sure that we knew who those authors, 
who the authors were and we internally publicised them and we say well done and we 
have a research recognition day and we make sure that we recognise those authors and 
we gave them certificates and what not. So, we wanted to make it clear that it was not, 
it did not count for DHET, so we forgot about it and we still made sure that they are very 
important because that collaboration, that Atlas collaboration is brilliant. I mean we have 
got a group of physicists that are really making a difference. They, you know they were 
part of the Higgs boson discovery and they are part of the Medela discovery that is about, 
they are about to announce shortly and what not. So, it has brought huge kudos and it has 
attracted people from around the world. 
 You know, so it has attracted people from around the world and it has enhanced our 
students’ capabilities because they have been exposed to these international people and 
the DHET has done nothing to support them. So, you know that is a shame in itself.”
In summary it appears that despite the lack of DHET incentive for participation in large 
collaboration, researchers are increasingly taking part in such collaborations for other reasons. 
Institutions are responding to the problem by ensuring that participants in large collaborations 
are not disadvantaged in terms of their career development and at least in some cases their 
effort is celebrated in different ways. 
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4.5 NEED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES
There was a mixed response on the need for change, with some respondents indicating that changes 
were imminent and others stating that “we do not use DHET system, so no big changes needed”. With 
specific reference to the large co-authorship issue, it was noted that “they are few and far between 
those papers” and as a result, there was no need to develop a specific set of guidelines.
There was also some concern about the possible impact of any changes on the present 
beneficiaries with one respondent noting that “if the system were to be changed and money 
would be taken away from people, there would need to be a focus on why that is being done”.
For those respondents for whom changes were considered necessary, their recommendations 
were addressed at the two levels of own-institution and the DHET. With respect to own-institution, 
minimal changes are being considered which leads to the conclusion that generally the 
leadership of the PRHEIs consider that although the problem statement may be valid, it is not of 
sufficient impact to induce the need for their action. 
However, a number of recommendations were made in terms of how the DHET system itself could 
be changed. Many of the interviewees were disparaging of the proxy nature of proportional 
publication counts as a means of measuring research outputs, as already noted in Section 4.2.1 
(“the DHET should adopt a system that is more nuanced; the current system is a blunt instrument 
that does not reward talent”), but acknowledged that metrics are generally a compromise 
between ease of application and accuracy. The declining value of the DHET funding per 
publication unit, as a result of static budgets and rising publication outputs, was also considered 
a drawback, since it was restricting the ability of HEIs to fund the incentive scheme.
In view of these difficulties, the interviewees made a number of suggestions for improvements to 
the system as follows:
 • There should be more funding for publications in high-impact journals, rather than treating all 
publications as equal.
 • Alternatively, there should be a smaller and more refined list of DHET-approved journals, 
which would lead to publications in high impact journals only being recognised. This change 
would introduce an element of quality control in the DHET grant and could help to reduce 
publications in predatory journals. It will also reduce the total number of publication units 
which are claimed by all the HEIs, hence maintaining some consistency in the monetary 
value of the DHET grant per publication unit, and by implication, the value of the disbursed 
publication incentive.
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 • The publication unit should be weighted according to author-agreed levels of contribution to 
the research and hence the final publication.
 • The monetary value attached to a publication unit should be kept above a minimum value, 
either by reducing the number of qualifying units or by increasing the total DHET grant. One 
respondent noted that “the one other thing that the DHET should consider doing is to go to 
(National) Treasury and ask for more money”.
 • The calculation of proportionality for the DHET publication unit should be based on the number 
of South African authors only, not authors from international or non-qualifying institutions.
 • The proposed funding allocations under the university capacity development grant should 
include a significant allocation for direct incentives to encourage collaboration with local 
HEIs (this recommendation is discussed in more detail in Section 4.6.1).
 • Institutions should consider other means of rewarding the work and contribution of a large 
research team, such as issuing special publications and media statements as may be 
warranted at the time of their discoveries. 
Table 5. Institutional guidelines for payment of publication incentive
UCT UJ DUT UWC SU WITS Explanation
Single author from 
RSA university  
See 
Note 3   
10% of DHET 
amount per PU
R10,000 or 
R20,000 
(see Note 
2)
 
Multiple authors 
from same 
institution
Divide 
by Nx
Divide 
by Nx
Divide 
by Nx Divide by Nx
Divide by 
Nx
Nx Authors 
from University 
X
Multiple authors 
from different 
eligible institutions
Divide by N 
where N = 
(Nx+Ny)
Divide by 
N where N 
= (Nx+Ny)
Nx Authors 
from University 
X, Ny from 
University Y
Multiple authors 
including authors 
from ineligible 
institutions (such as 
science council or 
international)
Divide by N 
where N = 
(Nx+Ny+Nsc+Nf)
Divide by 
N where N 
= (Nx+Ny)
Nx Author 
from X, Nsc 
from SC 
and Nf from 
overseas
Multiple authors 
from same 
institution where 
some are students 
or postdocs
See 
Note 1 ?
All authors 
treated 
equally
N Authors 
affiliated to 
X but Ns are 
students
1. Supervisor receives 50% of the payment due to the student or postdoctoral fellow.
2. Amount depends on whether the journal is WoS and/or IBSS listed (R20K) or not (R10K).
3. UJ is the only institution of this cohort in which individuals are able to receive part of the 
incentive as taxable income.
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4.6 DISCUSSION
The main objective of this study has been to review South Africa’s systems for recognising 
individual contributions to publications with more than 50 co-authors, and hence provide a basis 
for an evidence-based approach to such recognition. As part of the study, it has been necessary 
to review the overall systems for incentivising collaboration and academic publications, since 
these frameworks form the basis on which large co-authorships are recognised. In the following 
sections, the results of the study in respect of the publication incentive and the impact on large 
collaborations, are discussed.
4.6.1 Overall System for Incentivising Scholarly Publications
Although there is some diversity of approaches within the PRHEIs, the dominant approach to 
publication incentives is the use of proportional publication counts as defined by the DHET 
Research Outputs policy (DHET, 2015). The approach adopts a number of common principles, as 
follows:
i. It recognises that the research output component of the DHET block grant is a significant and 
important income stream for the HEIs; for this reason alone, but also for other reasons such 
as the international ranking of universities, it is in the interests of HEIs to incentivise scholarly 
publications.
ii. It also recognises that although publication output is a ubiquitous measure of academic 
output, whether at the level of the individual (such as professor, lecturer, researcher or head 
of department) or the institution (PHREI), it is a weak and inadequate measure of academic 
excellence and should be used with caution as a means of performance management or 
assessing prospects for promotion. In particular, it lacks the appropriate consideration of 
quality.
iii. The common international publication metric, which is often used for institutional 
benchmarking, is the average number of publications per FTE employee, the value for which 
varies considerably (from 0.2 to 3) (Bunting et al., 2017). However, within the population of 
this study (South African PRHEIs), the standard approach is the DHET metric of publication 
units, which includes various types of publication (such as books, book chapters and journal 
articles) and is adjusted for the number of authors; the latter adjustment is referred to as 
proportional counting (DHET, 2015).
iv. In order to incentivise scholarly publication, authors of articles in peer-reviewed journals and 
other DHET-approved publication types receive into their research accounts a publication 
incentive or reward in proportion to the number of authors and the institution’s agreed value 
per single unit, where the latter ranges from R10,000 to R20,000 per unit (see Table 5).
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v. As a general rule, the incentive is not paid directly to the author(s) as taxable income (only 
one out of all the PRHEIs surveyed in this study allowed such payment and it is reported that 
the DHET does not support such disbursements due to the consequent abuse of its system 
(Mouton, 2017; Tomaselli, 2017).
This study has not specifically looked at the question of whether the system of publication 
incentives achieves its intended outcome, namely, to increase the quantity, and perhaps the 
quality, of scholarly publications. Its continued existence and operation suggests, however, that 
it is effective and is at least partly responsible for the growth in publication outputs over the last 
two decades (Mouton, 2017). 
Despite this positive impact, it is clear that there are two emerging and persistent difficulties for the 
incentives, namely that the available funding pool is decreasing and that it fails to adequately 
recognise quality.
In terms of the overall funding pool, it is noted that payments to the HEIs from DHET for research 
outputs, which are used as the basis for the publication incentive, have declined as shown in 
Figure 29. Furthermore, on average only about 10% of these funds are paid into the research 
accounts, with the result that the publication incentive is considered by the respondents to 
have a relatively small impact on behaviour and is a minor contributor to the overall research 
costs, being limited to partial payment only for an item such as the attendance of an overseas 
conference. As a result, its ongoing basis as an incentive, already minimal, is further declining.
Figure 29. Research outputs and grant value per output (2015/16 to 2017/18)
Source: Minister of Higher Education and Training (2016)
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The quality issue, clearly important, remains unresolved although a number of recommendations 
are given in Section 4.5. These HEI Executives are favouring the approach whereby they tolerate 
the existing system, including the issue of proportionality, when disbursing funds to authors. They 
appear however to feel it is not fair that the funding to the institutions and the individual authors 
is reduced through authors that are not eligible for DHET funding (international collaborators or 
authors at science councils etc.) and made some proposals on how this should be handled, as 
discussed in Section 4.5.
The institutions also ensure that academics are not disadvantaged by proportionality when 
evaluating them for promotion. They do this by taking a broader view considering factors such 
as the standing of the journal in which the publication appeared, the prestige associated with 
working in these large collaborations and the impact of the publications produced in this manner.
Finally, it is noted that the respondents did not consider that misappropriation of the incentive 
through the present systems was a problem and required system-wide response.
4.6.2 Impact on Large Collaborations
Based on the responses in the study, this group of DVCs considered that a decision by an 
individual researcher to collaborate comes before a decision on co-authorship, given that the 
publication incentive is a small amount relative to the benefits of large collaborations, where 
the latter includes large-scale funding for research projects, international prestige and access to 
broader resources. 
In other words, this group considered that drivers for collaboration overwhelm the negative 
impact of the dilution of any publication incentive. Such drivers include building the national or 
international reputation of the university and the researcher, securing research funding, especially 
funding, which is designed to develop partnerships, accessing expensive research equipment 
and diversifying the skills of research teams.
4.7 CONCLUSION
The central problem statement of this study, namely the limited recognition of collaborative 
work for individual researchers within the framework of the DHET system of proportional counting, 
has been difficult to resolve in this study. There is no general agreement within either cohort, as 
surveyed in this chapter and in Chapter 3, on its solution, or indeed whether one is even necessary. 
It is possible, however, to make a number of general comments and recommendations based on 
the survey results as follows (all of which reflect the views of the sample only):
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Comments
 • Based on the views of the respondents and acknowledging that this may not be a general 
or widespread perspective, it is maintained that the present DHET system, and its institutional 
equivalents, has little impact on collaboration; the latter has a separate set of drivers which 
overwhelm any negative impact of the publication incentive (such as funding and prestige).
 • The respondents in the study believe that there is minimal misappropriation of the institutional-
level systems.
Recommendations (from the respondents)
 • Performance management should not use publication counts unless these are mediated by 
other indicators that include the quality aspects of academic outputs.
 • In order not to dilute the positive impact of the DHET system on publication outputs, the value 
of the research output grant per unit should be kept above a minimum level.
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5.1 BACKGROUND
HEIs in South Africa receive grant funding from the DHET based on a formula which includes the 
number of publication units. The present formula scales the total number of academic publications 
in proportion to the number of authors per publication, resulting in the total publication unit being 
about 60% to 80% of the total number of actual publications (see Chapter 2). The relevant figures, 
including the level of funding, are shown in Table 6. The funding amounts have been estimated 
based on the reported values for funding per publication unit (Pather, 2014) and the reported 
publication units (CHET, 2018).
Table 6. Summary of existing funding of selected HEIs for research publications (2016)
Institution Existing Funding(ZAR) Total Publications Total Publication Units
Total System 1,593,259,650 18,875 15,060
University A 183,820,073 3,256 1,737
University B 141,330,963 2,134 1,336
University C 6,777,352 75 64
Source: This study and Pather (2014) for funding, CHET for publication units, CREST for total 
publications 
This DHET approach, referred to as proportional counting, has a number of weaknesses including 
two concerns of the panel, namely that the system discourages collaboration and fails to 
recognise the contribution of individuals within large research teams (>100 authors). As a result, 
six alternative models were proposed by the panel. The algorithms for each model are now 
discussed, preceded by a brief summary of the existing DHET system, and followed by the results 
of a simulation in which the impact of each model on the DHET funding for ‘typical institutions’ was 
determined. The latter analysis is then concluded with a discussion of the broader consequences 
should the respective models be adopted by the DHET. 
5.1.1 Present DHET System
The present DHET system (DHET, 2015, para 5.7) requires that a research article published in an 
approved journal is subsidised as a single unit. In the case where authors are affiliated with two 
or more institutions, the subsidy is shared between the claiming institutions. Institutions submit 
audited subsidy claims for research outputs appearing in the approved journals. 
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS OF SIMULATION STUDIES 
ON ALTERNATIVE ALGORITHMS FOR THE 
CALCULATION OF PUBLICATION UNITS
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The guidelines also state that “fractions of units must be expressed in decimal form and must 
be rounded off to the second decimal place, for example 12.45” (DHET, 2015 para 5.21(e)). 
Although the practices of each institution may differ, it appears that this rule has been interpreted 
as truncating the units for each publication before computing the total number of units. In other 
words, the system is based on proportional counting up to 100 authors and then defaults to zero. 
The mathematical formulation is:
For all X ≤ 100
For X > 100                  0     
where:
PU = publication units (per author or institution)
X = number of authors
Pi = publication unit for publication i (usually 0.5, 1 or 5 depending on the type of publication) 
The linear scaling is apparent from the formula. The simulation work has attempted to calculate 
the total publication units, both at an aggregated level (all the HEIs) and at the level of individual 
institutions, using the data obtained from CREST but has been unsuccessful in obtaining a close 
match. Problems with the level of detail required for this exercise, and the detail which has been 
made available, are discussed in Section 5.
5.1.2 Proposal 1: Modified Korean Model
The Korean model, as previously listed in Chapter 2 has been modified in order to provide a more 
realistic alternative. The revised formulation is as follows: 
For X = 1
For X ≤ 10
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For X ≥ 10
where:
E = assumed level of enhancement (40% to 80%)
5.1.3 Proposal 2: Mesnard Model
The Mesnard model was designed to allow for greater recognition of collaboration and is an 
enhanced system of non-proportional counting. The mathematical formulation of the model is 
shown in the equation below; further details are in Chapter 2 and the ASSAf briefing document 
(ASSAf, 2016).
5.1.4 Proposal 3: Modified DHET
Proposal 3 follows the standard DHET algorithm with the exception that publications with the 
number of co-authors greater than 100 are divided by the total number of South African authors 
(authors affiliated to South African institution) and not the total number of authors.
The relevant equation is as follows:
For X ≤ 100
For X > 100
where:
Y = number of authors affiliated to South African institutions
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5.1.5 Proposal 4: Minimum Units with Upper Bound
Proposal 4 covers the concept of a single (article) publication earning at least 0.01 publication units 
with an upper bound for the total number of publication units per author. It has been motivated 
on the basis that it would ensure that authors on large publications are seen by their peers as 
contributing to the scientific effort of the collaboration adequately but are not ‘over-rewarded’.
The mathematical formulation of the model is as follows (for all X):
For an individual author: 
where:
UBi  = upper bound for publication units per author on publications with more than 100 authors
The effect of various UBi values on the calculation of publication units is minimal, as discussed in 
Section 5.4. The base case value is taken as 2 publication units per author.
5.1.6 Proposal 5: Modified Arithmetic Sequence
Proposal 5 is the simplest of the ASSAf alternatives. The scheme proposes that the system should 
be changed by removing the limit of 100 authors, and then converting to the nearest integer after 
adding all the publication units at the institutional level. In mathematical terms this would mean:
For all X 
5.1.7 Proposal 6: Contribution Matrix
The approach of the contribution matrix has been outlined in Section 2.6.2; this method was 
considered in the case of articles with more than 100 co-authors. The panel concluded that although 
such a matrix could be appropriate for small numbers of co-authors, it would be impractical for large 
numbers and was therefore not recommended for further modelling or implementation.
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5.2 METHODOLOGY OF THE SIMULATION
The consequences of the adoption of the alternative models has been assessed by developing 
institutional-level frequency data for the years 1996 and 2016. The choice of the two years was 
based on firstly the selection of the year for which the most recent and complete dataset was 
available (2016), and secondly the year a decade earlier (1996). The idea of two years was to get 
an idea of the trend in the consequences and enable a forward prediction, although as it turns 
out, this was not very useful.
Since the frequency data had to be manually generated, it was not possible to include all HEIs; 
the selected institutions, together with the reasons for the selection, are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. HEIs selected for inclusion in the modelling study
Institution
No. of 
Publications 
(2016)
Proportion of Total 
Publications > 100 
Co-Authors (2016)
Reason for Selection
University A 3,256 5%
Large number of annual publications; 
higher than average proportion of the 
total publications with > 100 co-authors
University B 2,134 1%
Large number of annual publications; 
small proportion of the total publications 
with > 100 co-authors
University C 75 0%
Small number of annual publications; small 
proportion of the total publications with > 
100 co-authors
Total HEI 
Publications
18,875 3%
The simulation proceeded as follows:
 • re-layered and reorganised the CREST data so as to allow institutional-level analysis;
 • developed histograms showing number of publication units for bands of number of authors 
(say 0 to 5, 5 to 20, 20 to 50, etc.) for up to ten institutions;
 • calculated the impact of the changes as per the five models.
The main difficulty with the analysis has been to separate affiliation from authorship, since some 
authors have multiple affiliations. In general, this distinction has been ignored but it has led to 
some issues with the data and inaccuracies in the final result. Other problems have been:
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 • The CREST data for institutions covers research articles and not all the publications such as 
books, conference proceedings and reviews.
 • The CREST data does not distinguish between conference publications, books and book 
chapters, all of which are assigned different weightings within the DHET system. 
 • The CREST data for total publications does not include data for HEIs only.
 • The data has not allowed calculation of the numbers of authors per publication, separate 
from the calculation of the number of institutions. In other words, the CREST data could not 
be used to calculate the number of authors per local institution. As a result, a set of average 
numbers, as shown in Table 8, was applied.
Table 8. Assumed average number of authors per South African institution as a function of X
Number of Authors/
Paper (X)
Assumed Number of SA Affiliated 
Authors/Paper
Assumed Average Number of SA Affiliated 
Authors/SA Institution
1 1 1
2 2 1
5 3 1
10 6 2
20 8 3
50 10 4
100 15 5
500 20 5
1,000 25 5
5.3 DATA SOURCES
5.3.1 Institutional Data
Data for the institutional-level histograms were obtained from the CREST database (Mouton, 
2017). The downloaded dataset covered the headings publication year, article number, number 
of authors, flag for multi-institution affiliation (true or false) and listing of affiliated institutions (South 
African institutions only).
The data was processed as previously outlined and used to generate the histograms for University 
A, University B and University C, as shown in Figure 30. Surprisingly, the average level of collaboration 
is high across the whole system, with the result that the average number of authors per paper 
did not differ as widely as was expected between the total system and the individual HEIs, with 
the exception of CUT for which the prevalence of single-author papers was indeed much higher.
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Figure 30. Institutional-level histograms (co-authorship frequency vs. number of authors)
5.3.2 Baseline System Data
Baseline data, covering funding, performance and outputs of the present system including total 
publications and publication unit numbers for the assessment period, were extracted from an 
updated version of the CREST data, as used in the initial phase of this project, from the Centre for 
Higher Education Transformation (CHET) database (CHET, 2018) and for the value of a publication 
unit from the published data of Pather (2014). The actual values are listed in Table 9.
Table 9. Annual outputs and funding of publication units
Publication Year Total Articles Estimated HEI Publications HEI Publication Units Grant Amount (ZAR/PU)
2006 11,401 8,390 8,086
2007 13,016 9,578 7,751
2008 14,604 10,747 8,352
2009 16,247 11,956 9,109
2010 18,228 13,414 9,748
2011 20,728 15,254 11,191 127,638
2012 21,974 16,171 12,364 115,052
2013 24,203 17,811 14,009 114,545
2014 26,343 19,386 15,542 113,975
2015 25,492 18,759 15,040e 113,183
2016 26,092 19,201 15,394e 108,691
2017 107,221
2018 (est) 103,979
Source: Pather, 2014, CREST and CHET
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5.4 RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION
The models result in changes to the total (system) publication units, and as a consequence, 
adjustments to the value of each publication unit, as shown in Figure 31. The baseline value per 
publication unit, based on the DHET algorithm, was calculated at R105,797 per unit; this value 
was then adjusted for each alternative model, and the revised value used to calculate changes 
to the institutional funding. Fractional changes (equivalent to the actual change in proportion to 
the original DHET allocation) were then calculated and are shown in Figure 33.
Figure 31. Impact of different models on total and HEI publication units
The total publication unit count is only very slightly increased for Proposals 3, 4 and 5 (< 0.5%), with 
the increase being due to the inclusion of publications in the unit counting where the number 
of authors exceed 100. Heavier weightings for collaborative publications, as used for Proposal 
1 (Modified Korean Model) and Proposal 2 (Mesnard Model), significantly increase the total 
publication unit count (by 36% and 104% respectively), and hence decrease the value of each 
publication unit, as shown in Figure 32.
Figure 32. Value of a single publication unit for each scheme (ZAR/unit)
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The implication of these changes on the overall level of funding for the HEIs within the DHET funding 
category which supports publication outputs depends similarly on the calculated publication 
units per institution. As expected, Proposal 5 (inclusion of publication units for all articles regardless 
of number of authors) makes little difference to the funding allocations, as shown in Figure 33 and 
Table 10. Of the test institutions, only the University A would receive increased funding (2%), since, 
as noted in Table 7, this institution has an above-average frequency of co-authored publications 
where the number of authors exceeds 100.
Figure 33. Fractional (%) changes to funding allocations to HEIs arising from publication outputs
Similarly, Proposal 3 (where publication units for articles with number of co-authors greater than 
100 are calculated by dividing the number of publications by the number of South African 
authors only) and 4 (where all articles would receive at least 0.01 of a publication unit subject to 
an upper bound of 2 units per author), make little difference to the overall funding levels, with 
the exception of University A where the amount is slightly increased in the case of Proposal 3. The 
effect of varying levels in the upper bound was tested and shown to have little overall impact, 
which is not unsurprising that the number of publications with more than 100 authors is still small 
(<3%) compared to the total number of publications.
Table 10. Results of simulation on total publication units and funding levels
Institution
Alternative Proposal
Proposal 1 Proposal 2 Proposal 3 Proposal 4 Proposal 5
University A 1% 13% 2% -0.44% 2%
University B -6% -4% -3% -0.85% 0%
University C -1% -1% -3% -0.89% 0%
 
-0 %
-20 %
-10 %
0 %
10 %
20 %
-40 %
Uni A Uni B Uni C
%
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 F
un
d
in
g
RECOGNISING INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH: 
Limitations of Proportional Publication Counts and Proposals for Alternatives 85
In contrast to the other proposals, the algorithms of the Modified Korean (Proposal 1) and the 
Mesnard Model (Proposal 2), both of which use a non-proportional approach designed to 
reward collaboration and not discount large co-authorships, provide interesting results. In both 
cases, the University A, which has an above-average level of co-authorship, would receive higher 
levels of funding, whereas Universities B and C would be penalised (in the case of University B by 
the amounts of -6% and -4% respectively for the two models). This result is consistent with the 
publication profile of each institution. University B has a lower than average level of co-authorship, 
and hence would receive a lower proportion of the DHET subsidy for publication outputs.
5.5 CONCLUSION
In this study, the consequence of five alternative algorithms for the calculation of numbers 
of publication units per institution have been assessed. Using frequency data for number of 
publications per year within five predetermined categories of number of authors per publication 
(1; 2; 2 to 5; 6 to 10; 11 to 50; 51 to 100; and >100), it has been shown that variants on proportional 
counting which include articles for which the number of authors exceeds 100, has little impact 
on the level of funding for individual HEIs, with the predicted changes being less than ±2%, even 
for the most prolific institutions.
The result is not surprising given that the proportion of articles in the highest category (>100 
authors) is less than 3% of the total HEI output. As a result, the difference in the total publication 
units between the two approaches (inclusion or exclusion of the highest category) is less than 
0.02%. The impact on individual scores could be more important, since single researchers with a 
high output (>50) of multi-author publications could move from a publication unit count of zero 
to 0.5.
The consequences of the two systems for non-proportional counting (Modified Korean and 
Mesnard) are more significant. In the case of the Korean model, where the algorithm is adjusted 
to reward co-authorship through two measures, firstly an enhancement factor for all co-authored 
publications and secondly an exponential factor for the calculation of publication units which 
does not decay to zero but is instead constant for publications with greater than 10 authors, the 
benefit to highly collaborative organisations is small (1 to 2%). On the other hand, the penalty to 
non-collaborative organisations, as measured by a low proportion of multi-authored articles is 
large (10% to 20%). For instance, University A, as an example of a highly collaborative HEI, would 
receive 1% more income whereas funding for University C would drop by 19%.
The consequences of the Mesnard system would be similar in direction but more pronounced 
since the funding for co-authored articles is more generous than the Modified Korean approach. 
For instance, under this system, the figures for University A and University C are +13% and -35% 
respectively.
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The object of this consensus report was to investigate how the contributions of individuals engaged 
in large scale (>100) collaborative research projects are currently recognised and whether this 
should be revised. This was undertaken with specific reference to the research output funding 
mechanism in place in the South African HEIs. Recognition of research output by individuals is 
often measured using the number of research publications or publication units. The last decade 
has seen an increase in the number of authors on individual publications, both in terms of the total 
number per publication as well as the average number of authors. This is true internationally, as 
well as in South Africa. However, the increase in the number of co-authors has a disadvantageous 
effect on the number of publication units that is assigned to an individual author or academic. 
In South Africa, the DHET allocates research funding to tertiary educational institutions based on 
a formula which includes proportional co-authorship as one input variable. Thus, universities have 
been incentivised to increase their publication output. Unfortunately, this proportional publication 
unit calculation has also been used by some HEIs to incentivise faculties and departments to 
increase the publication output of their staff. The consequence of this approach is that in some 
cases this has also encouraged individual authors to increase the publication units that they 
produce, by sometimes publishing greater numbers of less substantial articles, or submitting to 
journals that are perceived to be less rigorous in their peer-review processes. 
Performance management in the HEI environment is fraught with challenges. There is the contested 
terrain of management approaches developed in the private sector that are considered to 
be inappropriate for the career development of knowledge workers whose time horizons span 
extended periods of time. Academics are career professionals who are independently motivated 
and self-driven. Moreover, their outputs are not usually measurable in linear terms and the nature 
of outputs from different disciplines vary dramatically. However, universities are funded largely 
from public funding and need to account, and be accountable, for this support. Additionally, 
the availability of objective measures of performance to help managers evaluate whether 
academics are succeeding in their current roles, and which can be used as promotion criteria is 
desirable as part of a formal performance management system. 
One of the easier outputs to measure when evaluating academic performance is the number 
of publications that an academic has published. As is the case with any metric, merely counting 
the number of publications is simplistic; this number is dependent both on the nature of the 
discipline and on the form of the output. Other aspects, can be contentious such as the specific 
contribution of the author to the publication where there is multiple authorship. The use of the 
proportional publication unit approach, which is applied by the DHET, is a simple mechanism 
for distributing funding among institutions, but has deficiencies when it is used in performance 
appraisal systems of individuals. 
CHAPTER 6. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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The occurrence of hyperauthorship is challenging the use of existing performance appraisal 
systems and requires the revision of such systems in the interests of what could be described as 
‘performance justice’, which can be loosely defined as the principle that two academics who 
achieve equally, but work in different disciplines, should be equally rewarded or acknowledged. 
The impact of the widely-used DHET- ‘publication units’-based approach to performance 
appraisal is well illustrated by a comparison of the publication outputs from two academics, the 
one working in the engineering field, and the other in particle physics. The ‘average’ professor 
could be expected to generate five to ten publications per year, equivalent to 2 to 5 publication 
units. However, a physicist working within several large research teams might (co-) author 50 to 
100 publications per year, which will be measured as zero publication units (publications with 
more than 100 co-authors are rounded to zero). It is apparent, in these circumstances that the 
proportional counting metric is misleading.
The study included an initial literature review, followed by two surveys, covering firstly the attitudes 
of some researchers to the publication incentive and secondly the views of university executives. 
In the first survey, the opinions were mixed, with some respondents indicating that the present 
system is simple and fair, and others questioning its integrity and beneficial influence on research 
outcomes. Alternative suggestions include the incorporation of quality factors on the publication 
incentive and the weighting of proportional counting based on the individual author’s actual 
contribution. However, it is also clear that the system is inconsistently implemented and that 
there are varying degrees of understanding in terms of its actual operation. Both issues could be 
beneficially addressed at institutional level given a willingness to support the research system and 
the way in which co-authorship patterns are changing.
In the second survey, the respondents (senior university management) considered that the present 
DHET system, and its institutional equivalents, have little impact on collaboration; the latter has a 
separate set of drivers which overrides any negative impact of the publication incentive (such 
as funding and prestige). The respondents also suggest that there is minimal misappropriation of 
the institutional-level systems.
Recommendations (from the respondents) suggested that performance management should 
not use publication counts unless these are mediated by other indicators that include the quality 
aspects of academic outputs. In order not to dilute the positive impact of the DHET system on 
publication outputs, the value of the research output grant per unit should also be kept above 
a minimum level.
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The conclusions of these two chapters, while self-explanatory, need further comment. It is clear 
that there is a system of proportional counting in relation to multiple authorship that determines 
publication units for an HEI in South Africa. It is also clear that there is an incentive linked to these 
outputs that encourages institutions to increase their outputs, but that the way in which individual 
institutions cascade or devolve this system to individual academics varies across the country. 
Although there are cases in which publication units are used for performance management, the 
executives confirmed the criteria used for promotion were not only based on publication units. 
Indeed, the DHET Research Outputs Policy of 2015 advises institutions to be cautious of directly 
incentivising individual authors9.
Overall, researchers in South Africa understand that the system is not ideal, but clear proposals 
for an alternative approach did not emerge in this study. The present situation is that authors 
who publish with many co-authors are allocated either no publication units or small fractions of a 
publication unit at best.  Thus, the system appears to discourage collaboration and co-authorship. 
A number of recommendations for alternatives were suggested by various respondents during the 
study. The authors of this report decided to provide some simulations of these alternatives using 
South African data, since well-intentioned suggestions may fail if they are implemented with no 
testing. In this way, the impact of using a different system could be explored in order to determine 
its impact on the funding to different types of institutions. We note that these are not the only 
possible alternatives that could be used. The intention was not to be exhaustive, but to illustrate 
the impact that some of the suggestions might have, and to encourage simulation and pilot 
testing should alternatives be considered. The recommended approach results in recognition of 
multi-author publications that are not currently included in institutional or individual publication 
unit counts. Authors are then able to list these publications as earning publication units. However, 
these publications do not significantly disturb the current stability or predictability of the system, 
both of which are traits valued by the representatives of senior management interviewed. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recommendations to HEIs on their Treatment of Individuals 
1. There needs to be a greater awareness within HEIs of the ‘bimodal distribution’ in the numbers 
of co-authors (Fig. 7, p 24), particularly in the case of disciplines such as physics, genomics, 
medicine and statistics, where large numbers of co-authors are becoming more prevalent.
2. In the disciplines identified in 1, the appraisal of an individual’s performance must take 
cognisance of these developments. 
3. The DHET publication unit system should not be used as a metric to measure the publication 
output of individuals for the reasons articulated in the San Francisco DORA (see appendix D).
9 Research Outputs Policy 2015, Government Gazette, Republic of South Africa, Vol. 597, Number 38552, 11 March 2015, paragraph 3.1
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4. The use of the publication unit system is a poor proxy for the assessment of research productivity 
and should not be used in the selection and promotion of academics. 
B. Recommendations to the DHET on its Funding and Performance Management Relationship 
with Institutions 
1. The DHET formula for allocation of units should be modified to include publications with in 
excess of 100 co-authors. The funding formula is suggested in Proposal 5, p 79.
2. The funding per publication unit should be increased. Its real value has fallen as a result of 
inflation and as a function of the doubling of the number of recognised units produced (see 
Fig. 3, p 20). The incentive has been effective in achieving its intended outcome, but a larger 
allocation of funds is required in order to maintain a constant real value per publication unit 
to continue the successful trend.
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A. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERT PANEL
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH IN SOUTH AFRICA: how to evaluate and recognise contributions of 
individuals
Aim 
The aim of this proposed study is to provide a guiding framework for a multidisciplinary investigation 
of ways in which collaborative research can be appropriately recognised and rewarded in South 
Africa. 
Introduction
Usage of term
This document primarily addresses multiple authorship of research papers. The general term 
‘collaboration’, in research, can refer to the work done towards a common aim by a group of 
individuals, or by a number of research groups or institutions, or work performed across disciplines 
or between countries, or any combination of these. While illustrations of some of these are given 
below and the term ‘collaboration’ is used to describe them, the central problem in this document 
is concerned with papers with more than one author and particularly with those with more than 
ten or a hundred authors. 
The term ‘collaboration’ is also used in a specific sense to mean ‘a set of authors of a paper’, 
both in this document and in general scientific usage. As an example, the ‘ATLAS Collaboration’ 
appears in the author list of papers on the ATLAS experiment at CERN. The number of author 
names is 2932 on an example; the number of institutions of affiliation listed on this paper is 178.
International changes
A change in the nature of collaboration is taking place in the environment of intellectual 
endeavour and may be observed at present in the natural sciences, information sciences, social 
and health sciences. The problems now being tackled are so complex that they often require 
the contributions of individuals from a range of disciplines and skills in order to make progress. 
International funding and research networks (NIH, EU, CERN, HGP) have recognised the need to 
bring people together and combine resources since many of the research projects undertaken 
at present are just too big for one country to finance. 
Notwithstanding the role of small groups or single authors and researcher-driven publication, the 
nature of big collaboration has changed dramatically over the last decade and the nature of the 
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way in which participation in these projects is recognised needs to be considered. International 
funding mechanisms encourage collaboration, and, in many cases, are explicitly designed to 
ensure that it takes place.
South African response
This international change has been recognised in South Africa, and both the government 
Departments of Higher Education and Training, and Science and Technology in conjunction 
with the research community are responding to it. Collaborative projects are becoming more 
significant and we need to consider how best to advise funding agencies, researchers, research 
institutions, and decision-makers on the way in which these projects and their participants should 
be evaluated and rewarded. 
This project aims to review the mechanisms used internationally to evaluate the output of 
collaborative research, and then make recommendations on how to evaluate the output of 
collaborative research and propose a guiding framework for an evaluation scheme in the SA 
context.
Evaluation is a concern
There are growing indications that new thinking on evaluation is required in several fields in 
South Africa. These include physics, where, for example, formal recognition of South African 
participants in the discovery of the Higgs boson was difficult or absent, and a sound foundation 
for collaborative authorship of research outputs from SKA is needed; the biomedical sciences, 
where recognising the role of data scientists, statisticians, and downstream data analysis is difficult 
in huge consortia despite the provisions made by journals for statements on contributory roles; 
and fields where there is at present an absence of recognition for the critical roles of supporting 
scientists, engineers, and technicians.
Given the role of collaboration as a catalyst for innovation, it is important to review our systems for 
recognising individual contributions to high quality collaborative research, and more important, 
to provide a basis for informed decision-making in the future, keeping in mind possible unintended 
consequences.
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Problem Statement
The scientific community has identified some key challenges associated with participation in 
large projects. 
Evaluation for career advancement
The need for individual evaluation is increasing rather than decreasing. Many universities are 
now using the DHET Publication Unit metric when considering promotions, grading of research 
performance of staff, hiring of new staff and the shaping of internal policy regarding research 
directions. The DHET metric does not recognise papers with more than 100 authors. The impact of 
policy decisions based on this metric is of urgent concern and one of the consequences is that 
staff involved in hyperauthorships may choose to leave and work elsewhere.
The adoption of the DHET metric for University purposes is, of course, a matter internal to the 
institutions concerned. However, it is inescapable that the current incentive scheme devalues the 
contributions made to collaborative projects. The consequences include a lack of recognition 
for scientific contributions, with a direct impact on promotion and career advancement, and 
on career decisions on participation in large projects where recognition of contributions is 
problematic. To give a specific example from astronomy, in the ten large Meerkat survey projects 
which have of the order of 100 scientists participating at a time, the current DHET Incentive Scheme 
would not recognise individual, or institutional, contributions. However, these contributions to the 
knowledge outcomes of the projects would need to be assessed. 
Conflicting drivers
There is significant variation in the way in which universities make decisions regarding the 
importance and impact of the research outputs from, and the role of employees in, collaborative 
research. This can be accentuated in the context of limited resources at the research office level 
and may be further influenced by simultaneously striving to increase the quality and quantity of 
research output. The tension between encouragement to collaborate through megaprojects, 
and discouragement through institutional policy, needs resolution.
An understanding of the way in which individuals participating in collaborative projects can 
be rewarded may assist with providing recommendations that help institutions to address these 
dilemmas. 
Incentive funding
In environments where incentive funding per se is important, resources are not provided to those 
who participate in projects with numerous authors. This concern is reduced or negligible in well-
funded groups but may inhibit individuals from being able to establish independent careers.
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The major questions
In terms of evaluation of individuals, the underlying problem of finding fair, transparent, viable 
mechanisms for recognising individual contributions to complex collaborations in South Africa 
should be addressed. 
One aspect to be considered is an observed shift from fundamental science pursued in discrete 
disciplines (Mode 1) towards the convening of multidisciplinary teams to solve applied problems 
(Mode 2). A basic tenet of the study should be that aspects of current evaluations and incentive 
schemes that do currently work successfully for large scale collaborative projects should not be 
discarded; excellent science is being accomplished by individuals or in teams smaller than the big 
collaborations that are the source of concern; and this shift does not affect all fields of scholarship 
or all disciplines equally. A second major aspect is the discrepancy between disciplines in terms of 
bibliometrics, and this should be considered in the study as well; for example, publishing practices 
and indices are very different in engineering from those in the biosciences. Therefore, the help of 
sociologists of science may be needed. A requirement for the study is that it should be informed 
by similar studies in South Africa, notably the ongoing CREST study. The recommendations of the 
study should be aimed at creating a workable consensus in a contentious field.
This study as a foundation for the future
A study of this nature is timely given the number of big projects and global consortia that South 
Africa is participating in or coordinating. The Academy is well placed to review the way in which 
participants in large collaborative projects are recognised and rewarded. Based on an analysis 
of this information the study would make recommendations regarding the way that these matters 
should be treated in the future. 
 
The local academic community needs to develop appropriate methodologies and metrics to 
recognise individuals within collaborative research projects. The study that is proposed here will result 
in a set of recommendations that could be generally applicable to large-scale collaborative projects.
Target groups
The study is intended to primarily benefit researchers, policymakers, research funders, research 
institutions, higher education institutions and the research system. The outcomes of the study 
will provide policymakers and funders with recommendations and guidelines for implementing 
policies that will promote, support and encourage excellence in research particularly excellence 
in collaborative research while at the same time providing appropriate recognition for the 
participating individuals. Researchers and research institutions will benefit from the opportunities 
and acknowledgement of the importance of collaborations.
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Possible key questions for investigation:
• What defines a collaboration, and what roles are played in such a collaborative research 
project?
• Identify other, or similar studies currently being conducted in South Africa i.e. CREST, and how 
it could provide evidence for this project?
• Identify the extent of collaborations nationally and internationally and their impact?
• Investigate the role of an individual’s research contribution to a collaborative project to 
national funding decisions versus international practices? 
• Establish nature of incentives, type of research funded, policies underpinning incentivised 
funding, and recipients of such funding?
• Establish effectiveness of the incentive schemes used?
 » Has incentivisation increased quantity and quality of output?
 » Has incentivisation strengthened the importance of collaborative research? 
• Investigate any unintended consequences of the incentive schemes used.
• Propose solutions to the problems identified. 
Methodology
The Study panel guided by its Chairperson will be able to select appropriate methodologies to 
address the brief provided by the ASSAf Council, as described in the relevant Guidelines. These 
will include:
i. Hiring researchers to address sub-topics and help provide draft sections of the Report;
ii. Interviewing key individuals and stakeholders with oral and/or written input; 
iii. Holding public workshops with invited speakers and/or panel discussions;
iv. Holding Panel workshops to debate and resolve particular questions and issues
v. Delegating initial analysis of topics of the Study to individual members or sub-groups of the 
Panel; and 
vi. Any other ways of working towards a proper understanding of the evidence and information 
that can help to complete the Study.
Deliverables
The main output of the proposed study is an authoritative, peer reviewed, evidence-based ASSAf 
Report published in the public domain and presented to all stakeholders.
The Academy will also assist in disseminating the outcomes of the report to all stakeholders to 
promote the uptake of the recommendations, through a formal launch of the report, face-to-
face meetings with key stakeholders and using of media and Internet platforms.
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B.  APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2: DETAILS OF THE SCISTIP SURVEY
Overview
An investigation of researcher’s experiences of academic and scientific authorship in South Africa
Disputes on authorship are common across fields and may concern not only who is to be named 
(e.g. issues related to ghost authorship and honorary authorship), but also the sequence in which 
the authors should be listed. The goal of this study is to investigate South African researchers’ 
understanding and experiences of authorship ethics and the impact of research incentives on 
publication behaviour and authorship ethics. There are three phases to addressing this goal. 
The first phase focuses on direct and indirect research incentives and rewards to researchers 
in South Africa and its possible impact on authorship practices. The second phase investigates 
researchers’ understanding of issues related to academic and scientific authorship, including 
their perceived ability to implement authorship principles in an academic work environment, 
and possible challenges encountered with, and perspectives on, publication incentives. The 
third phase sets out to unpack researchers’ perceptions of publication incentives, authorship 
principles, and related politics of capacity building in academia, including issues of redress.
The knowledge generated from the data may help us to better understand how researchers 
think about academic and scientific authorship; their perceived ability to implement recognised 
guidelines for authorship within a context that promotes research integrity and responsible 
conduct; and the nature, or impact on publication behaviour and authorship practices, of 
incentive schemes in universities and research institutions. We are interested not only in normative 
views on this issue, but also in experiences of disputes and difficulties in making decisions about 
authorship, and responses to publication incentives. The question of authorship is an important 
ethical one, and affects people’s careers, as a publication list is one of the most significant 
measures of academic and scientific performance.
Covering Letter
Dear Prof/Dr/Mr/Ms
 
You are hereby invited to take part in a survey of how researchers experience academic and 
scientific authorship practices, and the incentives and rewards linked to authorship. This study 
is conducted by the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) and the DST/NRF Centre of 
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Excellence in Scientometrics and Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (SciSTIP). For more 
information about the project, click here. 
 
We are sending this request to all scientists and scholars in South Africa who have published peer-
reviewed scholarly articles, books, book chapters and/or conference proceedings since 2005.
 
We are quite aware of the demands made on people – and especially academics and scientists 
– to complete surveys of this nature. Given the importance of the study and the fact that it should 
not take you no more than 20 minutes to complete the survey, we sincerely hope that you will 
take the time to do this. In our preparatory work for this project, we have been made aware of 
considerable debate and strong feelings about authorship practices and incentives in South 
Africa; this will be the first study examining these issues nationally and represents an opportunity 
for you to state your opinion. 
 
Participation in this online survey is voluntary and there are no known or anticipated risks. This study 
has received ethical clearance from Stellenbosch University. You may decline to answer any of 
the questions and exit the survey at any time. All data collected will be treated as confidential 
and your anonymity will be protected in any reports or publications produced from the survey.
 
You have received this invitation because you have authored or co-authored at least one 
scientific publication accredited by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) for 
subsidy purposes.
 
Please reply and indicate whether you agree to participate in the survey. We will then send you 
the link to the electronic survey to complete.
 
Looking forward to hearing from you,
 
Cordially yours
 
 
Prof Johann Mouton  Prof. Roseanne Diab 
Director SciSTIP   Chief Executive Officer,
Stellenbosch University  Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf)
Research team: Prof Jan Botha (SU), Dr Lyn Horn (UCT), Prof Leslie Swartz (SU), Prof David Walwyn 
(UP), Ms Elsie Breed (SU)
(See also http://www0.sun.ac.za/scistip/?page_id=4118)
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C.  APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3: DETAILS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Overview
The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) has initiated a study of how collaborative 
research can be appropriately recognised and rewarded in South Africa (ASSAf, 2016). 
The Academy recognises that the participation of individual researchers in large national and 
international collaborations has become an increasingly common phenomenon of the research 
landscape. Notwithstanding the input of these researchers to the team effort, such a contribution 
is generally under-recognised, especially in large teams (>50 participants and hence authors). 
Given the role of collaboration as a catalyst for innovation, ASSAf has agreed to review South 
Africa’s systems for recognising individual contributions to high quality collaborative research, 
and hence to provide a basis for informed decision-making on the appropriate recognition for 
such individuals in the future. This study is being undertaken by an ASSAf expert panel.
A comprehensive review of the literature and high-level assessment of the existing systems within 
South Africa’s research institutions have already been completed. In the final phase of this project, 
the panel has undertaken to interview the Deputy Vice Chancellors (DVCs) of all public research 
universities in South Africa on the institutional response to, and impact of, the present system. In 
broad terms, this phase will seek to clarify the perspective of the university executive (research) on 
the present system of proportional reward, the general impact of publication counts, the ASSAf-
defined understanding of the problem statement and possible recommendations for alternative 
systems. 
The survey will take place through semi-structured interviews; an outline of the type of questions 
to be covered follows.
Questions
1. Respondent’s Background and Challenges as DVC Research
Briefly describe the background to the study and why the DVCs are being interviewed, as 
described in the introduction. At this point, although the material will not be used, it may be useful 
to ask about the respondent’s background and a couple of general questions on what the DVC 
considers to be the major challenges in his/her job (as research manager for a public research 
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university). The latter will be useful, but not critical in determining whether the proportional reward 
system, as introduced by the DHET, is considered to have any priority at all within the DVC’s diary.
2. Implementation of the DHET System for Publication Counts
The implementation of the DHET system, as a means of incentivising department- and researcher-
level publication practice, varies widely within the public research universities and science 
councils/national facilities. In this section, the intention is to develop a good summary of whether 
publication counts are important as performance indicators within the organisation.
 • Initial General Question: Is the system of publication counts, as defined by the DHET framework, 
used as a means of performance management within your university, either at a faculty level, 
or department level, or the level of the individual academic?
This question should be followed by more specific questions covering the way in which publication 
counts may be used within the university. Here are some suggestions:
 • Is the monetary award attached to publication counts, as received by your institution as 
part of the DHET funding, retained at a central level, or devolved to faculties, departments, 
individual research accounts and researchers?
 • Do different faculties within your university adopt different practices in terms of the monetary 
award? If so, please give two examples of the approaches.
 • If there is re-allocation to other levels, are you able to give figures of the proportions that 
reside in each level? What are these proportions?
 • Is the metric of publication count linked to performance management of university or science 
council departments/units?
 • Is the metric of publication count linked to performance management of individual 
academics?
 • (Is this metric used in any other way, apart from the abovementioned examples?)
 • (Is the metric irrelevant to the operational management within your university, other than as a 
means of calculating the DHET grant?)
3. Perception of the System in General
This section covers the DVC’s view or perception of the DHET system. It will be a good idea to 
read the Muller article before the interview. Perverse behaviour by academics in response to the 
incentive has also been reported in a study undertaken by CREST, supported by ASSAf. If you 
are aware of this study, and have access to the initial reports, it will also be useful background 
material.
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 • What do you think of the approach of proportional counting?
 • In your opinion, does the system of publication counts and hence proportional counting 
enhance the research output of the university?
 • Is the system effective in improving faculty, departmental and individual performance?
 • Are you aware of misappropriation by individual academics, as claimed recently by Muller 
(2017)? If so, how common is this practice.
 • Is it fair and equitable? If not, please give examples of cases where it is unfair or inequitable.
 • How would your institution evaluate the research component of job performance of an 
academic who published a high number of publications annually but accrued zero publication 
units due to the high number of co-authors?
 • Would your institution encourage a researcher, who published a high number of publications 
annually but accrued zero publication units due to the high number of co-authors, to seek to 
accrue publication units?
 • Could an academic faculty member of your institution who published a high number of 
publications annually but accrued zero publication units due to the high number of co-
authors, be considered eligible for promotion (assuming that they were eligible in all other 
aspects)?
4. Perception of the System as Applied to Large Collaborations
This section gets to the core of our study (the panel). It is important that all the questions are 
asked and that clear answers are obtained. The previous reports of this study (Walwyn, 2017) are 
important background documents for the questions. As a member of the panel, you may need 
to remind yourself of the material.
 • What are your perceptions of the DHET system as it is applied to universities, with specific 
reference to the case of large collaborations and co-authorship (>50 authors)?
 • Is it a barrier to such collaboration?
 • If so, is this barrier justifiable?
 • If the DHET approach of proportional counting is applied at the level of individual performance 
management within your university or institution, do you consider it to be disadvantageous to 
such collaborations?
 • If so, do you think this is a problem of sufficient importance that it needs a system-level 
response?
5. Suggestions or Recommendations for Improvements
In this section, it is important to gather suggestions for improvements to the present arrangements, 
particularly in terms of Section 5. The difference between these questions, and those in Section 7, 
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lies only in terms of the extent of ownership of the problems with the present system (if any have 
been identified) and hence whether the respondent may consider introducing any changes.
 • Could the system of proportional accounting be changed to provide greater recognition to 
large collaborations?
 • What recommendations should be made to the DHET?
 • What do you recommend to ASSAf in terms of the study’s objectives?
Examples of Alternatives: 
a. In South Korea, the universities have adopted a partial discount or non-proportional system for 
co-authored papers. For example, the author of a double authored paper may receive 80% 
of the credit of a single-authored paper, or more recently, the first or corresponding author of 
a double-authored paper receives same full credit as the author of a single-authored paper. 
b. In South Africa, the National Research Foundation uses an incentive instrument known as the 
‘Research and Innovation Reward Programme’. Each publication unit is allocated an amount 
of R60,000 (adjusted every few years), and the National Facility is then granted funding, 
additional to its core funding, in proportion to the number of publication units where the latter 
are calculated using the DHET subsidy formula. However, the NRF calculation differs from the 
DHET formula in that the calculation of the publication units is proportional to the number of 
authors only up to the level of 4 authors or 25% of the incentive. For publications by 5 authors 
and more, it is assumed that only 4 authors are involved. In other words, the value of the grant 
does not reduce below 25% of the initial grant of R60,000 per publication unit. 
6. Future Plans within the University on the Management of the System
The intention of this section is to establish whether the DVC considers the present arrangements 
to be inadequate or imperfect, with the result that changes at an organisational level are being 
planned. In the question below, ‘system’ refers to the use of proportional counting as a means of 
rewarding publication behaviour, as covered in the previous questions, but especially Question 5.
 • Is the university considering any changes to the way in which the system has been implemented?
 • If so, how will it be changed?
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D. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4: THE SAN FRANCISCO DECLARATION ON RESEARCH ASSESSMENT 
(DORA)
The need to improve the evaluation of research outputs prompted a statement from the American 
Society for Cell Biology (ASCB) in 2012 (ASCB, 2012). The statement, known as the San Francisco 
Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA) relies on key themes, the two most relevant being:
 • the need to eliminate the use of journal-based metrics, such as Journal Impact Factors, in 
funding, appointment, and promotion considerations;
 • the need to assess research on its own merits rather than on the basis of the journal in which 
the research is published.
The statement declares that a Journal Impact Factor should never be used as a proxy for the 
quality of individual papers, individual research contributions, or for hiring, promotion or funding 
decisions. Selected recommendations are shown below. An evaluation of the effects of DORA, 
its endorsement by institutions and individuals, was published in 2017 (Schmid, 2017). It is stated 
that the Journal Impact Factor was designed for use by librarians; as a surrogate for publication 
quality it is field-specific, is vulnerable to manipulation, and may lead to unnecessary delays in 
promotion of young scientists.
Selected Relevant Recommendations from DORA
General Recommendation
1. Do not use journal-based metrics, such as Journal Impact Factors, as a surrogate measure of 
the quality of individual research articles, to assess an individual scientist’s contributions, or in 
hiring, promotion, or funding decisions.
For Funding Agencies
4. Be explicit about the criteria used in evaluating the scientific productivity of grant applicants 
and clearly highlight, especially for early-stage investigators, that the scientific content of a 
paper is much more important than publication metrics or the identity of the journal in which 
it was published.
For Researchers
15. When involved in committees making decisions about funding, hiring, tenure, or promotion, 
make assessments based on scientific content rather than publication metrics.
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17. Use a range of article metrics and indicators on personal/supporting statements, as evidence 
of the impact of individual published articles and other research outputs.
18. Challenge research assessment practices that rely inappropriately on Journal Impact Factors 
and promote and teach best practice that focuses on the value and influence of specific 
research outputs.
SAIP and the PU
The increasingly broad use of the DHET Incentive Scheme PU was raised as a concern by the 
physicists at the Annual General Meeting of the South African Institute of Physics (SAIP) in July 2014. 
The Annual General Meeting appointed a SAIP Task Team to develop a Position Paper, which 
could be submitted to Government to alert them of its concerns and to propose alternatives. The 
Task Team issued a statement, in draft form by October 2014. In this statement, the Task Team 
noted, among many other items, that:
 • “many Universities are now using this PU metric when considering promotions, the hiring of 
new staff and the shaping of policy regarding the research directions of Departments and 
Faculties”;
 • “the Scheme is used for evaluation of individuals in some universities”; and
 • [an] “implementation issue concerns the adoption of the Scheme within Universities for 
purposes of individual assessment, for Performance Targets and Evaluation and Promotion.”
The Task Team met in 2014 with representatives of the DHET Research Coordination Monitoring 
and Evaluation Directorate, who noted that:
“the subsidy formula is a simple mechanism to distribute the subsidy among institutions as a block 
grant, and is not intended to be applied to individuals, for example for research evaluation. Each 
institution is free to spend its subsidy as it wishes, to support research as it sees fit, and therefore 
may support research from large collaborations if it is valued. Therefore, this issue is best resolved 
at institutional level.”
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